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Obama’s Conversion on Same-Sex Marriage: The
Social Foundations of Individual Rights
ROBERT L. TSAI
This article explores how presidents who wish to seize a leadership role over
the development of rights must tend to the social foundations of those rights.
Broad cultural changes alone do not guarantee success, nor do they dictate the
substance of constitutional ideas. Rather, presidential aides must actively recharacterize the social conditions in which rights are made, disseminated, and
enforced. An administration must articulate a strategically plausible theory of a
particular right, ensure there is cultural and institutional support for that right,
and work to minimize blowback. Executive branch officials must seek to transform
and popularize legal concepts while working within a broader professional and
political culture that respects the role of other branches of government, including
the prerogative of the courts to interpret the laws. A useful case study concerns the
Obama administration’s shift in position on the federal Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA) and its subsequent articulation of a theory of equality that encompasses
same-sex marriage. This episode should be understood, in part, as an act of
presidential leadership over individual rights, though presidentially-instigated
rights differ from judicially-derived ones. Recognizing this model of leadership
doesn’t require embracing executive supremacy, but it does suggest we ought to
emphasize institutional dynamics over party politics or social movements in
explanations of constitutional change.
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Obama’s Conversion on Same-Sex Marriage: The
Social Foundations of Individual Rights
ROBERT L. TSAI *
INTRODUCTION
When it comes to the protection of individual rights, one’s thoughts
can be easily clouded by the great myth of judicial statesmanship. We have
all been regaled with accounts of landmark rulings like Brown v. Board of
Education1 and Roe v. Wade,2 which inspire an abiding hope in lawsuits as
the best route to political justice. But this is an unrealistic ideal because
judges rarely, if ever, step out beyond the realm of a political or cultural
consensus to defend minority rights, real or imagined.3 Even if it were
possible to do so, it would not be normatively desirable for judges to stray
too far from what can be sustained socially and politically.
There are other reasons not to put one’s faith entirely in the legal
system. Judicial leadership over rights simply is not borne out in historical
practice. Through a combination of training and practice, judges tend to be
conservative by disposition; they are also constrained by elaborate systems
of procedural review and a professional culture that values workmanlike
resolution of specific cases rather than revolutionary action. Few judges
enjoy being reversed by higher-ranking judges, declared mistaken in their
legal methods, or branded traitors to the people when they issue rulings
that call into question voters’ moral choices. Judges promise finality but
*
Professor of Law, American University, Washington College of Law. Parts of this paper were
presented at the Constitutional Law Colloquium at Loyola University Law School in Chicago, the
Constitutional Law Roundtable at the University of Maryland, and workshops at American
University’s Washington College of Law. My thanks to Erwin Chemerinsky, Jim Fleming, Mark
Graber, Linda McClain, and Sachin Pandya. I am also grateful to the AU and University of Georgia
law students who have taken my seminar on Presidential Leadership, Legal Transformation, and
Individual Rights, as well as those who have taken my course on Jurisprudence. My Dean’s Fellows
Stephanie Leacock, Cody Meixner, Stephanie MacInnes, Haaris Pasha, James Purce, and Catherine
Warren rendered valuable research assistance. Generous support came from Dean Claudio Grossman,
Dean Camille Nelson, and Associate Dean for Scholarship Jenny Roberts. Michael Rondon and the
excellent staff of the Connecticut Law Review made the editorial process a pleasure.
1
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3
I join the chorus of political scientists and legal theorists who have found that constitutional law
rarely departs too far from national sentiment. See generally MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW
TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004); MARK A.
GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL (2006); GERALD N. ROSENBERG,
THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991); Robert A. Dahl, DecisionMaking in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957).
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can deliver, at best, the terms for future debate. Even when judges lay
down grand constitutional principles, they are inevitably subject to
narrowing and piece-meal reversal by subsequent decision makers, as well
as creative forms of resistance by political actors. Litigation can be critical
at various stages of transformative change, but what society obtains from
the judicial process is largely rhetorical in nature: public rationales, ways
of talking about rights, and a few choice phrases that can penetrate the
news cycle and capture the stakes for ordinary citizens.
This is all valuable cultural material from which we can begin a
national conversation or sustain legal transformations already under way,
but a judicial decision alone should not be mistaken for a final resolution
or the equivalent of democratic justice.4 A theory of rights based on the
false hope of judicial salvation ends in failure before it even begins. The
point is not that judicial participation in the development of rights is
unimportant—of course it is—but rather that judicial craftsmanship is
grossly incomplete as an account for how constitutional rights are actually
made or enforced and whether they will stand the test of time.
In truth, lasting legal change ultimately can be measured by the degree
to which political actors are successful in securing others’ compliance with
judicial rulings (either through acquiescence, socialization, or
institutionalization)5 and in creating the overall perception that
constitutional norms have become sufficiently settled that they are
obligatory (the way actors within the legal system talk about the law also is
a reminder that the “settlement” of law is a claim about social perception
of the law). We learn more about what constitutional rights actually mean
from how non-judicial institutions and political actors deal with ideas of
law and justice in their social milieu than from a glorious ruling itself
within the confines of existing jurisprudence. How elected officials choose
to respond to important judicial rulings, or what they do in stepping into
4

See generally ROBERT L. TSAI, ELOQUENCE AND REASON: CREATING A FIRST AMENDMENT
CULTURE (2008) (discussing the different ways in which social support for constitutional principles can
be measured and cutting into finer detail prevailing jurisprudential accounts of why citizens might obey
the law). Compare Leslie Greene, Law and Obligations, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 514–47 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2001)
(discussing the “obligatory” nature of law), with John Rawls, Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair
Play, in LAW AND PHILOSOPHY: A SYMPOSIUM 3–18 (Sidney Hook ed., 1964) (treating obedience to the
law as a matter of fairness because citizens enjoy the benefits of citizenship).
5
Acquiescence involves bowing to another’s interpretation whether in recognition of a superior
power or out of convenience, even if they do not publicly endorse its rationale. Socialization entails
self-conscious internalization of legal norms, which can occur through education, media, training, and
similar processes. Institutionalization takes the cultural theory of law to the next step of both
intentionality and permanence, where the building or remaking of organizations facilitates the
perpetuation of preferred legal views. Scholars in recent years have paid greater attention to processes
of socialization. See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990); Ryan Goodman &
Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE
L.J. 621, 628 (2004).
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the breach when judges refuse to enter a field of action or render
parsimonious readings of the Constitution, determines the actual scope of
American freedoms—often, decisively so.
For all of these reasons, we must pay careful attention to what I call
“the social plausibility” of rights: whether a certain interpretation of the
law not only seems to be a thoughtful solution based on acceptable modes
of argumentation, but also is likely to be publicly accepted by ordinary
citizens, public officials, and judges. But where some scholars try to match
judicial outcomes to majoritarian views in rather crude fashion,6 I believe it
is more descriptively accurate to say that, at any given moment in time,
there exists a range of socially plausible interpretations of legal text. That
way, we don’t assert the existence of consensus as another way of
imposing hegemony by falsely suggesting, even unwittingly, that for every
constitutional question there can be only one correct answer.
For every constitutional question there will be a range of socially
plausible interpretations. Some readings of text will be better than others,
while some interpretations will seem entirely out of bounds in the sense
that they are simply not culturally sustainable.7 A constitutional
understanding that seems outrageous is vulnerable precisely because of the
ease with which one might mobilize against it as a usurpation of authority,
an apparent act of will rather than a faithful reading of law.
There is yet another point that follows from these premises: because
constitutional interpretation is constantly being done by a variety of jurists,
agencies, institutions, and political actors, different theories of the
Constitution abound and jockey for legitimacy and dominance. This aspect
of the constitutional process entails an ideological conflict waged across
historical time, through a variety of bureaucracies and political resources.
Constitutional conflict is not the exact same thing as electoral conflict or
philosophical disagreement, and practitioners may engage in it according
to established customs, but it nevertheless uses the same basic apparatus to
make legal achievements and punish those who violate legal norms.
To illustrate these insights, this essay explores what it means for a
president to lead on questions of individual rights—that is, to depart from
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence and to insist that he has the better view

6
Examples of the correct insight—that courts tend to follow public sentiment rather than lead it—
coupled with overly brute pictures of the broader process of constitutional meaning-making include
Gerald N. Rosenberg, Judicial Independence and the Reality of Political Power, 54 REV. POL. 369
(1992) and Dahl, supra note 3, at 279–81.
7
Jack Balkin has colloquially referred to arguments that are not socially plausible at the moment
of interpretation as “off the wall.” Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST.
COMMENT. 291, 309 (2007). The real question is what institutions, practices, rules, and other things
constrain the field of social plausibility.
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of the Constitution. When a president decides to act in this way, he is
setting up certain kinds of social forces against other kinds of cultural
dynamics, while trying to capitalize on favorable social trends and
institutional practices. All of this is unavoidable, though the degree of
conflict can be made more or less visible, and the transformation of
individual rights can be accomplished either to foster societal acceptance
or inflame resistance.
There have been many intriguing examples of executive-led
development of constitutional rights, from Franklin D. Roosevelt’s call for
freedom of speech and religion “everywhere in the world” to Lyndon B.
Johnson’s championing of racial equality.9 Exploring when and how
presidential actors advance their own conceptions of individual rights
reveals the recurring obstacles to presidential leadership over such matters
as well as the social conditions that must exist—or be fostered—before
decisive action can be taken to alter status-quo theories of the Constitution.
Presidents do more than dutifully “enforce” judicially created rights;
they also make rights on an everyday basis by manipulating the social
foundations for individual rights. Presidents—or more accurately,
executive branch officials acting in the name of a president—theorize
about rights, implement what they believe to be the proper conception of
legal concepts, and in so doing, effectively create rights that differ from
juridically conceived ones. As Keith Whittington puts it, “The Constitution
is foundational in American politics, not only in the sense that it
establishes the boundaries of legal action but also in the sense that it
authorizes, invites, and structures political activity.”10 Political and social
activity ultimately determines the true scope of rights.
Rights discourse can be shaped through presidential will because
“visions of political leadership lead [a president] to push the boundaries of
that tradition.”11 That presidents occasionally seize a leadership position
with regard to individual rights and that they must respond to claims of
inequity in ways that differ from that of judges does not render their
8
Since the goal of this project is to arrive at insights about how presidents of any political
persuasion can lead on rights, the model is not committed to any baseline conception of rights. Thus, if
a president seeks to “expand” or “contract” rights, it is only in relationship to the courts and not to what
I consider to be a conceptual floor. Though important, whether it is a good idea to have a robust right in
any particular instance is not the central concern of this essay. Thus, when I speak of what presidents
are doing to rights, I am speaking only in relative terms rather than absolute ones.
9
For some recent scholarship on some of these episodes, see generally Joseph Landau,
Presidential Constitutionalism and Civil Rights, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1719 (2014); Joseph
Landau, DOMA and Presidential Discretion: Interpreting and Enforcing Federal Law, 81 FORDHAM L.
REV. 619 (2012); Robert L. Tsai, Reconsidering Gobitis: An Exercise of Presidential Leadership, 86
WASH. U.L. REV. 363 (2008).
10
KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE
PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 19 (2007).
11
Id.
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decisions less than constitutional law, but rather a different kind of
constitutional law.
Political actors do, and often should, push beyond juridic conceptions
of individual rights precisely because judges tend to be conservatizing
figures rather than visionaries. Presidents, like judges, are oath-bound to
defend the Constitution. But unlike judges, presidents are elected to
provide charismatic, and often visionary, leadership. Many presidents lay
claim to a form of popular sovereignty that is urgent and backed by
victories at the ballot box. This is true whether voters feel it is time for an
eloquent, multi-racial leader like Barack Obama to burnish America’s
reputation for freedom and equality or instead that it is time for a brash,
nationalist figure like Donald Trump to disrupt the patterns of elitism and
globalism.
Bringing the Constitution closer in line with the sentiments of the
people might require harnessing divergent, and even alternative,
interpretations of the Constitution to erode entrenched understandings
within the courts. But it’s not enough to want to change a legal regime.
How the gears of constitutional change are engaged matter. To be most
effective, presidents must pursue projects of legal transformation in ways
that are attentive to how their interpretive resistance is perceived. Because
of a widely-shared belief in both separation of powers and judicial
review,12 those who act in the name of the president must be viewed as
acting mostly within their proper spheres of influence, even as they seek to
alter the social conditions in which courts decide cases—all without
appearing to usurp the judiciary’s prerogative to “say what the law is.”13
Presidents are elected in part based on their agendas, which encompass
not only public policies but also popular perceptions of how key rights,
powers, and institutions might be reshaped. Through intense media
scrutiny and the major party system, candidates are pushed to be
transparent about their agendas and to sharpen the ideological consistency
of their positions. Elections authorize presidents to be empathic towards
others and to respond to the needs of citizens, on a broader scale than
judges can or should. If there is anything we have learned from the field of
presidential studies, it is that every president cares enormously about his
historical reputation. All of these characteristics of the institution can make
the presidency an effective guardian of liberty and equality when decisive
action is warranted and there exists political will to do so. The modern
president can challenge the laws and practices of states and local
governments when liberties are threatened, and can find ways to resist
12
Keith Whittington’s work shows how elected officials have, for their own reasons, helped to
prop up the perception of judicial supremacy, even if they do not always believe in it in a deep
philosophical way. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 10, at 26–27.
13
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 1, 177 (1803).
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legislative encroachments on individual rights at the national level. To the
extent new rules, institutions, and theories of law are formulated and
become socially grounded, they can also restrain successive
administrations.
During the Obama administration, we witnessed ingenious, and at
times highly effective, instances of presidential leadership over individual
rights. Take the topic of equal rights for gays and lesbians. President
Obama’s turnabout on gay marriage has received perhaps the most
attention. But in fact, in the years leading up to this event, the
administration had advanced a broad conception of equal protection of the
law across an entire spectrum of issues involving sexual orientation: the
federal workplace, military, tax policy, federal benefits, education, and
even foreign policy. And it did so in ways that went well beyond how the
U.S. Supreme Court and Congress understood the principle of
egalitarianism.
In this essay, I focus on the actions by the Obama administration on
gay marriage, which ultimately helped lead to the Court’s rulings in United
States v. Windsor14 and Obergefell v. Hodges,15 and theorize the episode as
the exercise of presidential leadership. My approach does not supplant
accounts that focus on the role of popular opinion,16 social movements,17
litigation strategy,18 or jurisprudence.19 Instead, I situate those elements
within an institutional model through which different players seek to
dictate the development of constitutional rights by turning social changes
into persuasive legal arguments.
This article begins in Part I by teasing out some of the unique features
of gay rights as a case study for presidential leadership. It does so by
examining in detail the Obama administration’s change of legal position on
the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). I explain how the
administration decided to repudiate DOMA, how it justified its decision,
14

133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013).
135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015).
16
See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Windsor and Brown: Marriage Equality and Racial Equality,
127 HARV. L. REV. 127, 127 35 (2013) (contending that changes in popular opinion made the Windsor
decision possible).
17
See, e.g., Zachary A. Kramer, Before and After Obergefell, 84 UMKC L. REV. 797, 801 (2016)
(“[T]here is no question that the gay rights movement has accomplished an incredible thing.”).
18
See, e.g., Josh Blackman & Howard M. Wasserman, The Process of Marriage Equality, 43
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 243, 246 (2015) (arguing that Obergefell resulted from innovative litigation
strategies).
19
See, e.g., Thomas A. Bird, Note, Challenging the Levels of Generality Problem: How
Obergefell v. Hodges Created a New Methodology for Defining Rights, 19 N.Y.U.J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL’Y 579, 599 (2016) (emphasizing Justice Kennedy’s choice to define a right at a relatively “higher
level of generality” than usual); Jack B. Harrison, At Long Last Marriage, 24 AM. U.J. GENDER & SOC.
POL’Y & L. 1, 52 (2015) (focusing on Justice Kennedy’s framing of the constitutional issue “within the
context of the evolution of the understanding of marriage”).
15

2018]

OBAMA’S CONVERSION ON SAME-SEX MARRIAGE

9

and how the administration’s theory of equality differed from judicial
theories of equality. In Part II, I explore the dynamics of jurisprudential
bootstrapping, an especially powerful tactic for a president, by which an
administration leverages achievements on rights in one domain to make
changes in another domain. More broadly, I venture into some arguments
as to why executive-based theories of liberty can be superior to judicial
interpretations. Finally, in Part III, I defend presidential leadership as a
model of constitutional lawmaking from the objection that it requires the
subordination of the judiciary. I conclude by distinguishing this model
from a leading account of constitutional change offered by Professors
Sanford Levinson and Jack Balkin called “partisan entrenchment” and
from explanations that emphasize the role of social movements.20
I.

PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP ON GAY MARRIAGE

My approach differs from the leading historical account of legal
change: the gestalt approach. The gestalt model explains major legal
changes as the byproduct of sweeping social and historical phenomena.21
By contrast, the leadership model stresses the role of autonomous decisions
by a president and his allies to either embrace or repudiate cultural
dynamics. These actions, taken with particular institutional and political
considerations in mind, help drive constitutional change or cement a
transformation already underway.
Professor Michael Klarman of Harvard Law School exemplifies the
gestalt approach to the stunning gay marriage rulings. Klarman argues that
the outcomes can be explained by “enormous changes in the surrounding
social and political contexts.”22 For Klarman, “the critical development has
been the coming-out phenomenon, which over a period of decades has led
to extraordinary changes in attitudes and practices regarding sexual
orientation.”23 While it is true that broad societal changes made it
conceivable that the Equal Protection Clause might be read to encompass
gay relationships, such an explanatory model tells us very little about the
20

Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional Change: From Partisan
Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 491 (2006).
21
See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, How NFIB v. Sebelius Affects the Constitutional Gestalt, 91
WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 43 (2013) (using a gestalt model to “organize[] our perception of cases, rules, and
doctrinal theories” regarding the development of constitutional law).
22
Klarman, supra note 16, at 132. One area of overlap between a descriptive model of
constitutional change that emphasizes broad cultural and ethical factors, such as Klarman’s, and the
model of presidential leadership I articulate here is a de-emphasis of the constraining capacity of legal
doctrines. For Klarman, the substantive law in landmark cases seems to be shaped by “strong intuitions
of fairness and right” rather than workmanlike reasoning from existing precedent and well-established
rules. Id. at 142. Moreover, he suggests that something akin to the judgment of history is a more likely
constraining factor than a raw evaluation of current public opinion. Id. at 160.
23
Id. at 132.
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timing, pace, or strategies involved. Indeed, gestalt models can feel oddly
deterministic, as if changes in society alone are sufficient to ensure the
transformation of constitutional law. Uncertain, too, in many such accounts
is how constitutional actors ought to treat shifting social terrain as a
normative matter when they interpret the Constitution.
Presidential action helps fill this gap in our picture of constitutional
lawmaking by illuminating the role of a critical player in the development
of individual rights on a national scale. It enriches our picture of how
constitutional change happens and makes the normative case that a
president’s portrayal of social change ought to be accorded some degree of
deference. As Obama reached the end of his first term, executive branch
officials advanced the cause of sexual orientation equality on a number of
fronts. Although the President himself had not yet endorsed gay marriage
as a substantive right, on February 23, 2011, Attorney General Eric Holder
informed Congress that the administration would no longer defend DOMA
in court.24
That strategic choice not only reflected changed conditions within the
administration on gay marriage, but also removed a major obstacle to more
aggressive executive branch efforts to articulate a broadened theory of
equality before the courts. Eventually, Department of Justice (DOJ)
lawyers would do just that, nudging the courts to catch up with the
administration’s more popular conception of equality and signaling to the
judiciary that pro-gay rights rulings would be supported by the executive
branch.
As this incident will demonstrate, a coherent theory of individual rights
must not be held captive by a false, court-centered sense of justice or
obscured by a formalistic understanding of constitutional interpretation.
Rather, a plausible account of executive branch constitutional lawmaking
must be attuned to the social foundations of rights in action. The most
fruitful line of inquiry into how rights are developed and enforced by
presidents, then, lies in the muck of party politics and confusion of
everyday institutional behavior. Here, I wish to underscore a crucial
methodological point: To uncover the ways in which political leaders make
and unmake individual rights, we have to soften the emphasis on formal
power and employ methods that favor descriptive accuracy. Once we get
this picture right, we must also approach normative questions of
constitutional law simultaneously from a social, strategic, and holistic
perspective.25
24

Letter from Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Off. of Pub. Aff., to Congress on Litigation
Involving the Defense of Marriage Act (Feb. 23, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/letter-attorneygeneral-congress-litigation-involving-defense-marriage-act.
25
George Edwards, who counts himself among the skeptics of the power of presidential
persuasion, nevertheless believes that astute presidents can exploit favorable circumstances to advance
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A few rules of thumb seem in order. First, although one human being
is elected president, in actuality, law is made by an administration
comprised of many individuals, agencies, and organizations, each with
their own motivations, spheres of influence, strategies, and experiences.
The environment in which executive decisions are made can be so
paralyzing that a leading scholar in the field once famously quipped that
the president is really a glorified “clerk.”26 All the same, these confining
social conditions can be transcended to make dramatic progress on a matter
of individual rights—whether it is to expand, reconceive, or limit them.
The conditions for political action on a question of individual rights shift
depending on the interaction of these relationships and organizations
against a broader economic and cultural backdrop. Actions to move the
needle on rights taken in one historical moment might not be socially
plausible at another moment in time.
Second, when a president acts in the name of liberty or equality, his
theory of rights is shaped according to significant strategic considerations.
Considerations of professional reputation and public prestige influence a
president’s behavior in ways that differ from similar constraints on judging
or congressional law making. If favorable social conditions create
opportunities for presidential action, then we must also learn more about
the range of forms which executive action might take when rights are at
stake. Tactically, political actors working in the name of a president decide
when and where to advance an individual rights agenda.27 Within the
modern administrative state, these figures determine which levers of power
to press, what resources to marshal for these purposes, how hard to fight
for a cause, and how broadly to define a constitutional right or liberty.
Collectively, these tactical choices influence the odds that
constitutional change is enduring rather than fleeting. A targeted
intervention by officials might be most tempting on a highly controversial
issue and yield incremental gains; while on another occasion, flooding the
zone by using multiple resources at a president’s disposal over a range of
related issues touching on rights might be called for. The latter approach
best describes the Obama administration’s approach to the rights of sexual
minorities: building social and institutional grounding for an expanded
an agenda. GEORGE C. EDWARDS III, THE STRATEGIC PRESIDENT: PERSUASION AND OPPORTUNITY IN
PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP 1–9, 188–89 (2009).
26
RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN PRESIDENTS ix (1991).
27
Whereas Neustadt emphasized a president’s power to persuade others and to reach political
bargains, other scholars have explored a broader range of presidential tactics. See generally JOHN P.
BURKE, PRESIDENTIAL POWER: THEORIES AND DILEMMAS 56–58 (2016) (adding ten other sources of
presidential power, including “coercive power” and “agenda power”). Those who follow Stephen
Skowronek stress historical trends as constraints on what presidents can and cannot do, even if they are
committed to a decisive course of action. See generally STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, PRESIDENTIAL
LEADERSHIP IN POLITICAL TIME: REPRISE AND REAPPRAISAL (2011).
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theory of equality in carefully selected areas, and then leveraging those
successes to make gains in other areas.
It is true that strategic considerations affect all judicial rulings, but the
ones facing presidential actors differ in crucial ways. Broader societal
values and political realignments can reshape the decisions of judges, but
they do so far more slowly and indirectly than they do for presidential
decisions. The politics affecting judicial outcomes are more bureaucratic in
nature and diffused throughout multi-member tribunals like a court of
appeals or the Supreme Court. By contrast, presidents and their aides can
respond more nimbly and aggressively to changes in cultural sentiment and
political trends.
A president committed to popular defense of rights can wield tools that
are both more efficient and effective than those available to judges. The
judiciary’s primary advantage on rights involves the institutional respect
given to the legal system charged with interpreting the laws, as well as the
procedural mechanisms that can be manipulated in defense of rights.
Executive branch officials have far more tools at their disposal for creating,
and sustaining, popular conceptions of rights.
Third, an individual right can look very different as its contours are
shaped by the unique strategic and social realities facing a president.28 The
differences between politically-created and juridically-ordered rights are
important to appreciate, since the true measure of any particular right lies
in some uncomfortable amalgamation of the two. The complex nature of
our rights regime builds inefficiencies into the legal order precisely to deter
the violation of individual liberties. But this design complexity, which
encourages political leaders to theorize about rights, does not render
political rights incoherent or less tangible than juridical creations. To the
contrary, there are good reasons to expect that in a number of situations,
politically entrenched rights may be more durable than judicially
articulated rights. After all, a president will be more invested in the rights
he has played a role in creating.

28

For now, I shall resist getting embroiled in terminological debates with other scholars over
whether to call presidential enforcement of the Constitution something else. Keith Whittington, for
instance, has called presidential action “construction” of the Constitution to distinguish it from
“interpretation,” something he believes is reserved for judges alone. See generally KEITH E.
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING
(1999). Other theorists have described parts of judicial review to entail “construction.” For ease of
understanding in this essay, I will refer to “presidential action,” “initiative,” or “leadership” to broadly
encapsulate how presidential actors enforce their understandings of the Constitution. These actors have
their own “interpretations” of the Constitution or “conceptions” of rights.
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A. Rights in Action: Party, Reelection, History
Gay rights present an instructive area for case studies because it is
difficult to call progress on this front the product of pure majoritarianism.
To begin, we should dispense with the claim that such dramatic progress
on gay rights was inevitable, because this perspective denies the agency of
constitutional actors and tells us nothing in particular about the pace or
means of legal change. Instead, constitutional transformation on gay rights
occurred because some softening of cultural mores created opportunities to
be exploited by legal actors within a complex political system. These
figures made key strategic decisions to force a deep rethinking of legal
concepts.
Despite a greater societal tolerance of sexual difference, there remain
religious traditions and influential cultural institutions that look upon
homosexuality as sinful and corrosive of traditional sex roles. Attitudes
toward homosexuality have shifted far more rapidly within the Democratic
Party—leading to greater pressure for legal changes that benefit sexual
minorities when Democrats occupy the White House. But those same
pressures do not exist to the same degree in the Republican Party, whose
grassroots activists tend to hold more socially conservative views about
marriage, sexual identity, and sexual behavior.
The fact that political power is diffused among different institutions in
the American system is another reason why majoritarian sentiment can be
so easily obstructed even when it exists. A president whose party does not
share the majority of voters’ view of human sexuality or their sense of
egalitarianism can frustrate the development of the law so that it does not
reflect popular attitudes. Similarly, a dissenting party’s control of one
house of Congress can impede the passage of anti-lynching legislation or
the addition of sexual orientation to the nation’s civil rights laws. What is
true about public policy is even truer about constitutional law’s
connections to popular sentiment: whether to close that distance, and how
quickly to do so, remains a matter of strategic action rather than
predestination or the mystery of cultural change alone.
Presidential leadership on gay rights seemed to be driven not only by a
moral imperative shared keenly by Democratic Party members and more
weakly by average citizens, but also by an overriding desire on the part of
President Obama to be perceived as a strong national leader. No one was
ever deemed a great president by being merely a faithful “party man.”
Stepping forward to defend politically vulnerable minorities can produce
positive reputational effects for a president if presented in the right way.29
29

As James MacGregor Burns observes, “Role-taking, carried to its ultimate degree, implies
finally the absence of leadership (aside from the purely ceremonial), for the leader-actor assumes as
many roles as society in all its component parts demands, and in doing so he mirrors society rather than
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When a tantalizing opportunity to make a mark on history arises, one
would expect an astute president to treat the long-term gains to his
historical reputation from championing the rights of political minorities as
greater than any costs that may be paid by his party (e.g., a momentary dip
in public esteem, further polarization of the electorate, electoral losses by
the party, even political realignment). This was precisely the calculation
made by Lyndon B. Johnson when he famously quipped, “Well, what the
hell’s presidency for?” in response to questions of why he was spending so
much political capital on behalf of landmark civil rights legislation.30
Let us return, then, to the world before Obergefell v. Hodges;31 it was
really not that long ago. Polls showed that since a high point of public
opposition to gay marriage around 1996, resistance to the idea had steadily
declined until 2010 or 2011, when more people began to support gay
marriage than oppose it.32 Younger Americans increasingly embraced the
policy of gay marriage, though there was nothing that could yet be
described as a sustained majority or supermajority of voters committed to
permanent change as a matter of national priority. In fact, crucial pockets
of objection remained: one of every three Americans was not swayed by
advocates of gay marriage, and a majority of black Americans generally
and white evangelicals specifically continued to oppose legalization of gay
marriage.33 Party affiliation also mattered: only 35% of registered
Republicans favored a change in traditional marriage.34
For a new Democratic president who was already cautious by nature, it
made sense to not identify the controversial issue of gay marriage as a high
priority early on.35 In terms of agenda setting, other matters—such as
transforms it . . . . Far from being a slave to a role system, the great leader . . . may actually smash it
and set up another system in which his roles are differently structured.” JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS,
ROOSEVELT: THE LION AND THE FOX 486–87 (1956).
30
ROBERT A. CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON, THE PASSAGE TO POWER xv (2012).
31
135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees same-sex
couples a fundamental right to marry).
32
Nate Silver, How Opinion on Same-Sex Marriage is Changing, and What It Means, N.Y.
TIMES, (Mar. 26, 2013, 10:10 AM), http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/26/how-opinionon-same-sex-marriage-is-changing-and-what-it-means.
33
In June 2015, the overall number of Americans opposed to same-sex marriage dropped to 39%.
Support for Same-Sex Marriage at Record High, but Key Segments Remain Opposed, PEW RES. CTR.
(June 8, 2015), http://www.people-press.org/2015/06/08/support-for-same-sex-marriage-at-recordhigh-but-key-segments-remain-opposed/. Fifty-one percent of African Americans opposed gay
marriage. Id. Broken down according to religion, seventy percent of white evangelicals opposed samesex marriage. Id. Republican support of the idea stayed around thirty-five percent. Id. A year later, the
numbers are largely the same. See Changing Attitudes on Gay Marriage, PEW RES. CTR. (June 26,
2017), http://www.pewforum.org/2016/05/12/changing-attitudes-on-gay-marriage/.
34
Support for Same-Sex Marriage at Record High, but Key Segments Remain Opposed, supra
note 33.
35
Any shift in policy on gay marriage would not only have dominated the early days of Obama’s
presidency, it would have also been an open repudiation of the policy of the last Democratic president,
who signed DOMA into law.
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stimulating economic growth, reforming health care, and improving the
international reputation of the United States after the Bush administration’s
prosecution of the war on terror—appeared more urgent to White House
officials. Additionally, the Supreme Court had already acted to ensure that
the principle of sexual privacy extended to homosexuals and identified
anti-gay animus as an illegitimate motivation for disadvantaging sexual
minorities.36 For many politicians, these decisions reduced the overall
sense of urgency over gay rights. Indeed, influential figures within the
Obama administration thought it more important to preserve gains on this
front rather than to extend rights if doing so risked undermining other
priorities.
Obama’s struggle with his own faith and public responsibilities also
played a role in the cautious development of an equality-based
understanding of the issue.37 As a candidate, Obama opposed gay marriage
but supported civil unions,38 a compromise that did not damage his
candidacy during the primaries. At that time, he paid no political price for
his views because the social environment was in flux, with Democrats and
gay-rights activists divided over whether to move more deliberately by
supporting civil unions or instead to risk backlash by seeking recognition
of same-sex marriage as a basic right of citizenship.39
In 2010, Obama described himself as conflicted whenever he was
asked about gay marriage, with his views on the matter “evolving.”40 In his
answers, Obama often referenced his religious upbringing along with his
devotion to civic equality, but this ambiguity can be explained by a desire
to position himself as a leader capable of bridging multiple constituencies:
black and white, gay and straight, insider and outsider.41 Taking too many
36
See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 637 (1996) (holding that an amendment to a state
constitution violated the Equal Protection Clause by making homosexuals unequal to others); Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (holding that gay people have the right to engage in private,
consensual, sexual activity under the Due Process Clause).
37
JO BECKER, FORCING THE SPRING: INSIDE THE FIGHT FOR MARRIAGE EQUALITY 120–21
(2014).
38
When asked about a questionnaire he signed as a candidate indicating his support for gay
marriage back in 1996, Obama’s aides later claimed that he meant only endorsement of civil unions. Id.
at 285.
39
See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND THE FUTURE OF
GAY RIGHTS 142–44 (2002) (arguing that civil unions were more sustainable than gay marriage at the
time). Activists who favored civil unions felt it critical to secure whatever support could be mustered
for same-sex relationships, to build on those achievements, and to avoid the sort of backlash against
gay rights that occurred when the Supreme Court of Hawaii declared a right to gay marriage under its
state constitution. Pro-marriage activists, on the other hand, worried that support for civil unions might
satiate the demand for legal change and harden the situation into a segregation-like status for gay and
lesbian unions.
40
BECKER, supra note 37, at 268.
41
See id. at 294 (explaining that Obama “feared that embracing the same-sex marriage could
splinter the coalition he needed to win a second term”).
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positions on hot-button issues can render a person unelectable as a national
candidate. He would not be the first presidential candidate to finesse his
policy positions, and he certainly will not be the last to do so. On questions
of race, as with sexual orientation, Obama often spoke in inclusive but
vague terms.42 As a policymaker, he tended to act even more deliberately,
building support while avoiding the most controversial matters until he saw
a way forward.
President Obama would eventually announce his personal support for
gay marriage on daytime television, but not until just six months before the
2012 election, and only after Vice-President Joe Biden stole his thunder by
publicly endorsing the cause.43 At the time, supporters of gay marriage
within the administration believed the president to be sympathetic to the
cause, but uncertain whether the timing was right in that sufficient numbers
of Americans would support such an expanded theory of equality.44 Valerie
Jarrett, a close confidant of the president and an important liaison to the
gay community, lobbied Obama to come out in support of gay marriage.45
First Lady Michelle Obama also signaled to activists that the
administration was working its way toward public support of gay
marriage.46 And others who lobbied administration officials on the matter
cited opinion polls showing a more receptive electorate, and made
arguments emphasizing the president’s legacy and the importance of
showing moral “character” in the eyes of voters.47
In other areas, Obama had no such reservations about extending equal
protection of the law to sexual minorities, showing that presidential action
was, in fact, being taken on gay rights in a variety of areas, but also that the
42
See id. at 296 (“I think it’s important to say that in this country we’ve always been about
fairness, and treating everybody as equals.”).
43
Behind the scenes, some prominent figures, including Valerie Jarrett and Michelle Obama,
urged the president to change his public stance to reconcile his public and private views, and to
influence the public conversation. See BECKER, supra note 37, at 288–93. Biden’s comments in his
interview with David Gregory on Meet the Press were not a trial balloon but unscripted; though months
earlier, Obama had already asked aides to explore how he might explain a change in position. Id.;
Michael Barbaro, A Scramble as Biden Backs Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. Times (May 6, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/07/us/politics/biden-expresses-support-for-same-sex-marriages.html.
Pollsters began testing the various ways to describe gay marriage as a right. See BECKER, supra note
37, at 288–93. Thus, Biden’s statements may have sped up the timetable, but a change in policy on gay
marriage appeared already in the works.
44
Id. at 293–94.
45
Id. at 293.
46
See id. at 284 (“Hang in there with us, and we’ll be with you after the election.”).
47
See id. at 289. Biden, too, before his public statement in support of gay marriage, told the hosts
of a private fundraiser in Los Angeles, “Things are changing so rapidly, it’s going to become a political
liability in the near term for an individual to say, ‘I oppose gay marriage.’ Mark my words.” Id. Beyond
acknowledging the changing social terrain, Biden also made a normative point, which is that he saw it
the duty of the executive branch to reflect in law and policy a more expansive, popular theory of
equality that encompassed same-sex marriage: “And my job—our job—is to keep this momentum
rolling to the inevitable.” Id. at 286.
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administration prioritized marriage below equality in the military and
workplace contexts.48 Obama had already begun the cautious process of
dismantling “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” the federal ban on gay soldiers
serving openly in the armed forces. Repeal would eventually be certified in
July 2011, after painstaking work suggesting that social support for a
policy change would be supported not only by top military brass, but also
by service members.49
Obama’s success on this matter stood in sharp relief from President
Bill Clinton’s abject failure to change military policy so gay soldiers could
serve openly in the early 1990s. A cautious, collaborative approach was the
lesson Obama had drawn from President Clinton’s disastrous effort to lift
the ban on gay military service only to swallow the bitter pill of “Don’t
Ask, Don’t Tell,” a legislative codification of the anti-gay personnel
policy.50 Clinton had failed to do the hard work of tending to equality’s
social foundations, and that inattention had incurred the wrath of military
leaders, soldiers, and voters.51 President Clinton’s failed leadership strategy

48
For example, in a presidential candidate questionnaire, Obama indicated that he would support
a non-discrimination policy for federal contractors that included sexual orientation and gender identity.
Stephanie Condon, Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA) makes progress in the Senate, CBS
NEWS (Nov. 4, 2013, 8:08 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/employment-non-discrimination-actenda-makes-progress-in-the-senate/.
49
Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the President on Certification of
Repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell (July 22, 2011). See BECKER, supra note 37, at 265 (“More than 70
percent [surveyed] said the effect of repealing the ban on gays and lesbians serving openly would be
positive, mixed, or nonexistent, leading the study’s authors to conclude that the ban could be lifted with
minimal risk to the current war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.”). A broadened notion of sexual
equality was eventually codified in military policies:
Service members will no longer be subject to administrative separation based solely on legal
homosexual acts, a statement by a Service member that he or she is a homosexual or
bisexual (or words to that effect), or marriage or attempted marriage to a person known to
be of the same biological sex . . . . Sexual orientation will continue to be a personal and
private matter. Applicants for enlistment or appointment may not be asked, or be required to
reveal, their sexual orientation . . . . Enforcement of service standards of conduct, including
those related to public displays of affection, dress and appearance, and fraternization will be
sexual orientation neutral . . . . Harassment or abuse based on sexual orientation is
unacceptable and will be dealt with through command or inspector general channels.
Memorandum from Clifford L. Stanley, Under Sec. of Def., Dep’t of Def., on Repeal of Don’t Ask
Don’t Tell and Future Impact on Policy, to Secretaries of the Military Departments (Jan. 28, 2011).
50
By the time of Obama’s election, it became clear that “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” was an utter
failure to the extent that one of the goals might have been to reduce the risk of witch hunts if service
members kept quiet about their sexual orientation. In fact, some 13,000 troops were expelled from the
military after the creation of the new policy, at a faster clip than before Clinton’s intervention. See
Bryan Bender, Continued Discharges Anger “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” Critics, BOSTON GLOBE (May
20, 2009), http://archive.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2009/05/20/continued_discharges
_anger_dont_ask_dont_tell_critics/ (showing gay rights advocates’ disappointment in Obama’s
approach to integrating homosexuals into the military).
51
See BECKER, supra note 37, at 9–10 (“Clinton had already taken a beating for trying to end a
policy that allowed the military to discharge a service member for being gay; he would up forced to
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even sparked the vocal opposition of a fellow Democrat, Senator Sam
Nunn (D-GA), who vowed to make Clinton pay a political price for
blindsiding him with a plan for social engineering.52
Obama’s success in extending the principle of equality to military
service showed how a nimble blend of pragmatism and idealism could
result in real legal gains. Far from satisfying social progressives within the
Democratic Party, however, this crucial victory merely stoked the hope for
constitutional changes in other areas of life for gays and lesbians. In fact,
as we shall see, the administration eventually leveraged legal changes that
improved life for sexual minorities in the military setting to create a
broadened notion of equality in the domestic arena—most notably, on the
issue of gay marriage.53
B. The Attorney General Repudiates DOMA
Until Obama announced his unequivocal support for gay marriage,
other incremental steps had to be taken in the name of equality while trying
to hold together a governing coalition.54 Making these changes balanced a
variety of concerns, both partisan and principle. Collectively, they
vindicated a position of equal dignity for gay Americans, but left the scope
of any principles strategically vague. This tactical ambiguity as to the
proper scope of equal protection of the law reflected not only electoral
constraints, but also at least three other factors: (1) the importance of
respecting appearances of the Presidency as an overtly law-enforcing body
rather than an overtly law-making or law-interpreting body; (2) Obama’s
own mix of legal and policy priorities; and (3) a belief that time was on the
side of the pro-gay rights perspective because of changes in cultural
attitudes about homosexuality.
settle on a compromise policy called ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ that allowed gays and lesbians to serve
only if they kept their sexual orientation hidden.”).
52
See Adam Clymer, Lawmakers Revolt on Lifting Gay Ban in Military Service, N.Y. TIMES,
(Jan. 27, 1993), http://www.nytimes.com/1993/01/27/us/lawmakers-revolt-on-lifting-gay-ban-inmilitary-service.html (“Congressional resistance to President Clinton's promise to let homosexuals
serve in the military broke into open revolt today, threatening to derail Democratic plans for quick
passage of family-leave and health legislation.”). Not only did Senator Nunn vow to publicly oppose
Clinton’s announced plan to end the ban on gays in the military, he also threatened to codify the ban in
legislation when it previously represented merely military policy. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, too,
including Colin Powell, vigorously and openly opposed a policy change at that time, with some
military leaders using anti-gay epithets during these discussions. See Margaret Carlson et al., Then
There Was Nunn, TIME, July 26, 1993 (describing the tensions between the Clinton administration and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff), http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,978951,00.html.
53
For war-dependent arguments deployed by President Obama in favor of gay marriage, as well
as how such arguments can be leveraged in multiple domains, see Robert L. Tsai, Three Arguments
About War, 30 CONST’L COMMENT. 1, 24–27 (2015).
54
This coalition consisted of not only the party faithful who wanted decisive action on gay rights,
but also moderate voters who might be open to progress on these issues.
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Thus, plasticity in the president’s theory of equality served multiple
political functions. By contrast, doctrinal ambiguity on the part of judges
ordinarily serves very different purposes: showing deference to political
actors, acknowledging access to imperfect information, and maintaining
the appearance of stability in the law by reducing the sheer incidence of
mistakes and reversals.
Then a key turnabout occurred on gay marriage. By letter dated
February 23, 2011, Attorney General Eric Holder informed Congress of the
administration’s intention to change its legal position on the
constitutionality of DOMA.55 For two years, consistent with the president’s
“evolving” view on gay marriage, DOJ had continued the prior
administration’s policy of defending the law as a reasonable legislative
prerogative while assuring constituents that the president “opposed”
DOMA on principle and would work for its legislative repeal.56 This
somewhat passive strategic position did not satisfy gay rights activists and
donors, but it did reflect the president’s own uncertainty over whether laws
recognizing only traditional marriage should be treated as hostility towards
sexual minorities, and it allowed the administration to make progress on
more pressing agenda items without being embroiled in a major social
values debate.
Suddenly, in a dramatic sea change in enforcement policy,57 DOJ
lawyers would no longer defend the law in court, having determined that
“heightened scrutiny” should apply to DOMA and that under this more
stringent standard, the law should fall. If DOMA proved to be
unconstitutional after DOJ’s own internal analysis, then government
lawyers could not and would not defend the law in court as a matter of
principle and duty.
In a striking move, the administration pled a plethora of changed
circumstances to justify the government’s newfound refusal to defend the
55

Letter from Eric Holder, Atty. General, to Congress (Feb. 23, 2011),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/letter-attorney-general-congress-litigation-involving-defense-marriageact.
56
E.g., Declan McCullagh, Gay Rights Groups Irate After Obama Administration Lauds Defense
Of Marriage Act, CBS NEWS (Jun. 12, 2009, 6:56 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/gay-rightsgroups-irate-after-obama-administration-lauds-defense-of-marriage-act/ (“As a presidential candidate,
Barack Obama claimed ‘we need to fully repeal the Defense of Marriage Act,’ . . . . This week, the
Obama administration is facing the ire of gay rights groups after it filed a brief in California federal
court defending the Defense of Marriage Act . . . .”).
57
This decision was itself contentious within DOJ, with Holder overruling at least two deputies,
including Neal Katyal, acting Solicitor General, and Tony West, head of the Civil Division. See Sari
Horwitz, After Overruling Top Justice Department Lawyers on DOMA, Holder Feeling Vindicated,
WASH. POST (June 27, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/justicedepartment-had-debated-handling-of-law-denying-benefits-to-gay-couples/2013/06/27/06e56304-df4d11e2-b94a-452948b95ca8_print.html (explaining that Attorney General Eric Holder viewed the
Supreme Court’s ruling against the 1996 Defense of Marriage Act as a victory for equal protection in
the United States).
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law. The press release issued by the Attorney General’s office the same
day the letter was delivered to congressional leaders confirmed this line of
argument for public consumption: “Much of the legal landscape has
changed in the 15 years since Congress passed DOMA. The Supreme
Court has ruled that laws criminalizing homosexual conduct are
unconstitutional. Congress has repealed the military’s Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell policy. Several lower courts have ruled DOMA itself to be
unconstitutional.”59
There is a lesson here about constraints and opportunities. Shifting
social conditions can create an opening to take decisive executive action on
a matter of individual rights, but they also can serve as independent
rationales for a course of action. Holder’s letter proved to be a textbook
example of these insights as the Obama administration staked out a new
theory of equality. First, the collection of occurrences gave the impression
that anti-gay fervor in other institutions had waned, and that the president
was no longer resisting the mobilized sentiment of the people by defending
the rights of sexual minorities—something that might have been the case
back when Clinton signed DOMA into law. Moreover, the letter implied
that the president saw it as his job to respond to changes in public
sentiment and in the law. The Obama administration appeared to
characterize the current Congress as no longer hostile to gay marriage,
predicting that it would be unlikely to resist a broadened theory of equality.
Second, Holder noted that “new” DOMA cases were being litigated in
the Second Circuit, a jurisdiction “which has no established or binding
standard for how laws regarding sexual orientation” should be reviewed.60
In other words, social activism in the courts had presented DOJ with a
fresh opportunity to reconsider an inherited policy (though it might be
noted that the president had the power to rethink his constitutional view at
any time).
Third, a series of adverse judicial decisions softened the Obama
administration’s resolve to support DOMA (which was already weak given
its inherited position in tension with the Democratic Party’s platform),61
causing lawyers and policymakers (like many other Americans) to rethink
58

Letter from Eric Holder, Atty. General, to Congress, supra note 55.
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Statement of the Attorney General on Litigation Involving
the Defense of Marriage Act (Feb. 23, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/statement-attorneygeneral-litigation-involving-defense-marriage-act.
60
Letter from Eric Holder, Atty. General, to Congress, supra note 55.
61
The Democratic Party platform calls for “the full repeal of the so-called Defense of Marriage
Act,” based on broadly stated principles of equal dignity: “We support the right of all families to have
equal respect, responsibilities, and protections under the law. We support marriage equality and support
the movement to secure equal treatment under law for same-sex couples.” Democratic Party Platform
Drafting Committee Releases Language of Pro-Marriage Plank, FREEDOM TO MARRY (Aug. 9, 2012),
http://www.freedomtomarry.org/blog/entry/democratic-party-platform-drafting-committee-releaseslanguage-of-pro-marri.
59
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their views. Once they did so, a new interpretation of the Constitution
emerged.
Note, too, that progress on gay rights in other domains then became an
independent reason for making progress on the marriage question,
suggesting an irresistible force to the logic of those earlier actions. I have,
in another context, called attention to this form of jurisprudential
bootstrapping, whereby constitutional actors leverage gains on one issue to
make progress on another issue.62 But here it makes sense to see it as a
broader approach to advancing rights by creating the impression of
irreversible cultural and legal change, whatever the truth might be.
Repeal of the ban on gay military service is the most dramatic change
invoked as part of this bootstrapping strategy, one initiated by the Obama
administration itself, though it is carefully portrayed here in more popular
and deferential terms—as a reflection of Congress’s considered judgment
and as evidence of legislative support for gay rights.
What is going on here is complicated, and we have to make educated
guesses based on what political actors say publicly and what we know to
be the social constraints acting on this kind of high-profile decision.63 At
the outset, we should lay on the table the foundational principle that the
power to enforce the law is committed explicitly by the Constitution to the
president. Most authorities on this subject agree that this enforcement
power includes the discretion not to enforce a law deemed
unconstitutional, though they differ on the exact scope of this power.64 For
62
See Robert L. Tsai, Three Arguments About War, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 1, 26 (2015) (showing
how President Obama “bootstrapped the military service question into the one about marriage,
implying that action on one front ineluctably leads to progress on the other”).
63
At some point, when internal legal memoranda and notes are available and biographies are
written, we may gain a richer view of what happened.
64
See David Barron, Constitutionalism in the Shadow of Doctrine: The President’s NonEnforcement Power, 63 J.L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 61, 63–64 (2000) (“This article challenges the courtcentered approach to the scope of the President’s non-enforcement power.”); see also Neal Devins &
Saikrishna Prakash, The Indefensible Duty to Defend, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 507, 508–510 (2012) (“The
belief that the President must enforce and defend laws that he thinks unconstitutional is widely held,
although there is substantial disagreement over the obligation’s scope.”); Dawn Johnsen, The Obama
Administration’s Decision to Defend Constitutional Equality Rather than the Defense of Marriage Act,
81 FORDHAM L. REV. 599, 602–03 (2012) (addressing the issue of “the proper scope of presidential
interpretive authority pervad[ing] government”); Dawn E. Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement of
Constitutionally Objectionable Statutes, 63 J.L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 8, 10 (2000) (“Constitutional
commentators, as well as the political branches of our federal government, continue to debate the
existence and parameters of the President’s authority to refuse to enforce constitutionally objectionable
statutes. . . . In this article, I consider the legitimacy of what I will term ‘presidential nonenforcement.’”); Walter Dellinger, Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional
Statutes (Nov. 2, 1994), https://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc110294.html (“We do not believe that a
President is limited to choosing between vetoing, for example, the Defense Appropriations Act and
executing an unconstitutional provision in it. In our view, the President has the authority to sign
legislation containing desirable elements while refusing to execute a constitutionally defective
provision.”).
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his part, Holder acknowledged the reality of “vast discretion” enjoyed by a
president in enforcing the laws.65 Why, then, were his explanations for the
administration’s rejection of DOMA far more complicated than they
needed to be? The answer is that, on such a controversial matter, President
Obama wanted to present a principled solution, one that did not seem mere
capitulation to partisan interests, the usurpation of another branch’s
powers, or the abdication of the Chief Executive’s duty to enforce federal
law.
C. Appearances Matter: Collaboration or Unilateralism?
It is against this backdrop of popular expectations that Holder’s
explanation makes the most sense. What we are interested in, for the
moment, is the role constitutional analysis played in Holder’s explanation
to Congress and the American public. Overall, the approach could be
understood as equal parts predictive, justificatory, and popular. President
Obama allowed the Attorney General to make this announcement, framing
gay marriage as a matter of what the rule of law required rather than what
some constituents desired. The announcement itself was predictive in the
sense that it tried to anticipate what the U.S. Supreme Court might do once
it squarely addressed the constitutionality of DOMA (though as we have
learned, the Court itself frequently reaches decisions without agreeing on
general methods). This orientation appealed to citizens and elites
accustomed to ideas of judicial supremacy, without actually taking this
position openly and committing to it. No president would surrender his
power to another branch unequivocally, but the appearance of institutional
acquiescence can pay political and social dividends.
Not all presidential efforts take a predictive orientation toward rights
development (sometimes it’s intended to be corrosive of prevailing judicial
interpretations), and so DOJ’s orientation was notably predictive rather
than combative.66 But unilateral or anti-judicial actions (and even those
65
Called before the House Committee on Judiciary to explain his turnabout on the enforcement of
DOMA, Attorney General Holder stated: “There is a vast amount of discretion I think that a President
has, and, more specifically, that an attorney general has, but that discretion has to be used in
appropriate way so that you are acting consistent with the aims of the statute, but at the same time,
making sure that you are acting in a way that is consistent with our values, consistent with the
Constitution, and protecting the American people.” Hearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary,
113th Cong. 2d Sess. (2014) (statement of Eric Holder, Att’y Gen. of the United States). Holder’s
further explanation of the president’s enforcement power reveals that it entails a combination of legal
and value judgments.
66
The Obama administration took a more combative posture with respect to the U.S. Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence on voting rights, especially a president’s own power under Section Five of the
Voting Rights Act. After the High Court’s ruling in Shelby County v. Holder, President Obama stated,
“Today’s decision invalidating one of its core provisions upsets decades of well-established practices
that help make sure voting is fair, especially in places where voting discrimination has been historically
prevalent.” Press Release, White House Off. of the Press Sec’y, Statement on the Supreme Court
Ruling on Shelby County v. Holder (June 25, 2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
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that merely appear to be unilateral or anti-judicial) can be more costly to
sustain than those that appear to be, or are in fact, collaborative projects.
For better or for worse, the courts themselves have often taken the view
that presidential actions supported by another branch of government are
more likely to be constitutional, and that unilateral presidential acts are
more vulnerable to challenge.67 If nothing else, such rulings confirm a
traditional preference for socially grounded assertions of law.
DOJ lawyers sought to supplement and render the existing law of
equality more coherent, rather than undoing what the Justices had wrought.
But make no mistake: despite its self-presentation, the Obama
administration was still making individual rights law and interpreting the
Constitution more broadly than its counterparts. Holder’s letter was
justificatory in that it offered a host of reasons for the shift in enforcement
policy. It acknowledged Congress’s prerogative to make the laws, and
sought only to explain the administration’s considered judgment in
refusing to defend the law. This respectful posture also tried to preempt
criticism that the non-enforcement decision was a partisan one or based on
Obama’s personal preferences. What the Constitution requires instead, and
what Holder took pains to emphasize had occurred, was a presidential
decision based on “careful consideration, after review of [the Attorney
General’s] recommendation.”68
The legal analysis was defensive in the general posture struck as the
executive branch tended to the social plausibility for expanded rights.
Holder characterized DOJ’s own equality-making activity as mere gap
filling: where there are gaps in the law, it can hardly be said to be usurping
judicial review for political actors to reach their own good-faith conclusion
about what the Constitution requires.69 Although experts might accept that
the power to enforce encompasses the power of non-enforcement, ordinary
office/2013/06/25/statement-president-supreme-court-ruling-shelby-county-v-holder. Holder went even
further, calling the Court’s ruling “a serious and unnecessary setback,” with “the potential to negatively
affect millions of Americans across the country.” Att’y Gen. Eric Holder, Remarks on the Supreme
Court’s Decision in Shelby County v. Holder, DEPT. OF JUST.
(June 25, 2013),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-eric-holder-delivers-remarks-supreme-courtdecision-shelby-county-v.
67
Justice Robert Jackson’s Steel Seizure Case concurrence stands for this view. See Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“When the President
acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own
independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent
authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain.”).
68
Statement of the Attorney General on Litigation Involving the Defense of Marriage Act, supra
note 59.
69
See, e.g., Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, on
Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, to the Honorable Abner J.
Mikva, Counsel to the President (Nov. 2, 1994), https://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc110294.html
(displaying the consensus approach of the Office of Legal Counsel, which usually permits greater
presidential creativity on a constitutional question when the U.S. Supreme Court has remained silent).
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people (and by extension, their elected representatives) might not hold
such a sophisticated view. Refusing to enforce a law sounds lawless and
tyrannical, especially if a president can pick and choose which laws to
enforce.
The expectation of the Obama administration must have been that the
president’s discretionary action was more palatable, and more likely to be
treated as legitimate, when cast in constitutional principles. Importantly,
this general orientation is consistent with the long-standing view of the
professional class—most of the lawyers that, at one time or another, offer
legal opinions on behalf of the executive branch.70 The message conveyed
through the Attorney General’s resort to judicial decisions, then, was that
President Obama cared deeply about the rule of law as well as the
protection of political minorities. He believed himself duty-bound to rise to
the occasion based on his independent determination as to what the law
demanded, especially when other institutions proved indecisive.
Maintaining the appearance of executive-judicial cooperation was
especially important because Congress had already spoken explicitly on
this issue by denying that equality was seriously implicated by
heterosexual marriage (this was the central message of DOMA, after all).
The makeup of Congress had most certainly changed, and the prospect of
passing a similar law in 2011 had waned—these were all factors to
consider in deciding just how aggressive a president should be in
disowning a duly enacted law. But even if the Obama administration
expected Congress to acquiesce to the president’s view on this issue, the
impression of inter-branch coordination could go some way in reducing
excessive heat around a controversial matter and smoothing the path
toward a different socio-political consensus.
D. The Scope of the Right
The Attorney General hedged his bets by saying that he would merely
refuse to defend DOMA in the courts.71 In all other respects beyond
70

See, e.g., Memorandum from David J. Barron, Acting Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t
of Justice, on Best Practices for OLC Legal Advice and Written Opinions, to Attorneys of the Office,
(July 16, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/legacy/2010/08/26/olc-legal-adviceopinions.pdf (outlining how the Office of Legal Counsel provides controlling advice to the executive
branch on questions of law).
71
As a number of experts pointed out, this transitional approach to DOMA was fraught with
practical complications. See, e.g., Joanna L. Grossman, Defense of Marriage Act, Will You Please Go
Now!, CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 155, 165 (2012) (“The complications of DOMA have begun to
reveal themselves in earnest as the same-sex marriage and its equivalents have spread across the
country.”). Some have gone further, claiming that the position was incoherent and should have gone
further. See, e.g., Robert J. Delahunty, The Obama Administration’s Decisions to Enforce, But Not
Defend, DOMA § 3, 106 NW. U.L. REV. COLLOQUY 69, 75 (2011) (contending that the
Administration’s decisions were “incoherent and unprincipled”).
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litigation, he would enforce the law deemed by the president to be
unconstitutional until such time as the courts ruled conclusively on the
matter. This compromise in February 2011—indicating only a partial
willingness by DOJ to follow through on the president’s legal judgment
that sexual orientation triggers heightened review—signaled a desire to
deny the imprimatur of the rule of law to DOMA, while allowing public
sentiment to sort itself out regarding other gay rights issues and giving the
courts a role to play.72 It represented an effort to announce a new
constitutional principle of equality and the methodology to be utilized by
presidential actors, but to sever those features of constitutional lawmaking
from the question of enforcement.
To be sure, the bolder move by far would have been to carry out the
administration’s new interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause and to
present it to the world as a fait accompli. Doing so would have been a
powerful implementation of the executive branch’s revised theory of
equality. But such a strategy would also have been a boon for opponents of
gay marriage, incensing the institutionally cautious along with social
conservatives, and possibly provoking a more negative reaction from the
courts than necessary. It was apparent, too, that the president did not wish
to say anything that might help anti-gay marriage forces in states
considering the question legislatively or via referendum. Executive branch
creativity at the state and local levels had prompted an outcry, as some
mayors and county clerks, interpreting their own obligations under state
and federal law, began unilaterally handing out marriage licenses to samesex couples.73 Many observers condemned those actions as illegal acts of
defiance, and the consequences of such a reaction at the national level
would be even greater, where an outcry obscuring the constitutional stakes
might be crippling for a nascent right.74
72
When President Obama ultimately decided to support gay marriage, he publicly cast the move
in terms of the Golden Rule, a time-honored way of popularly describing the concept of equality.
Transcript: Robin Roberts ABC News Interview With President Obama, ABC NEWS (May 9, 2012),
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/transcript-robin-roberts-abc-news-interview-president-obama/story
?id=16316043. The rhetorical approach put the burden squarely on those who oppose a right to justify
an exception to this basic notion of fairness. It also draws on an idea that exists in a cross-section of
religious traditions, implying that a believer, too, can support marriage equality.
73
Importantly, these actions suggested that any socio-legal consensus over the right of marriage
as purely a heterosexual institution might no longer hold.
74
After Obergefell, resistance by county clerks and other state and local officials occurred
sporadically. See Eliott C. McLaughlin, Despite Same-Sex Marriage Ruling, Resistance Persists, CNN
(June 30, 2015, 10:06 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/30/us/same-sex-marriage-supreme-courtruling-holdouts/index.html (detailing the various public officials who refused to issue marriage licenses
to same-sex couples or who voiced their opposition to doing so). For the most part, courts treated the
refusal to issue a marriage license to same-sex couples as improper defiance of the law rather than
evidence of a wholesale rejection of the constitutional principle. See Miller v. Davis, 123 F. Supp. 3d
924, 944 (E.D. Ky. 2015) (explaining that a county clerk in this situation is refusing to fulfill her lawful
duties, but failing to state that she rejects the constitutional principle).
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Plentiful other evidence suggested that the president wished to signal a
cautious executive approach, even after this turnabout on DOMA.
Although DOJ announced that “heightened” review would be applied in
the future by the administration to matters involving sexual orientation,
nowhere did Holder try to specify whether intermediate or strict scrutiny
was most appropriate.75 The administration may only have been parroting
the Supreme Court’s own strategic ambiguity on this matter, for even in
pro-gay rights decisions like Romer and Lawrence, the Court avoided
specifying which tier of scrutiny was required for laws that implicate
sexual orientation.
But I wish to tease out a very different set of legal and political
benefits when executive branch actors rely on conceptual vagueness in
evaluating rights. First, so long as DOMA was eventually struck down, the
administration could claim credit for predicting the outcome and
vindicating constitutional rights. Thus, we can imagine the possibility of a
political dividend if a president was later proven to be farsighted, as well as
stalwart, in defending the ideal of equality. That a president might be later
proven correct—and even heroic—through historical judgment should not
be underestimated.
This long view is a powerful reputational consideration that can be
harnessed on behalf of individual liberties. But even a decisive loss in the
Supreme Court, if it came, might not undermine the political gains from
seizing a leadership role on a matter of national importance. A certain
ambiguity about the full scope of gay rights can therefore facilitate a
steadier commitment to rights and incremental gains by an administration,
even more so than confident proclamations of principle followed by
embarrassing retreats.
Second, Holder’s position rendered it harder to accuse the president of
interfering with the judicial function because he did not behave in a way
that undermined the High Court’s prerogative or undercut any of its
rulings. Thus, the president appeared to be gently nudging the courts in the
direction jurists apparently had already charted, and filling gaps along the
way, rather than usurping a coordinate branch’s powers.
Third, such ambiguity about what a commitment to equality requires
preserved a great deal of policy discretion within the executive branch.
Even after announcing that some sort of heightened review should apply to
laws based on sexual orientation, lawyers and policymakers could still
theoretically take the view that on some policy matters—say, in certain
security situations—being cognizant of sexual orientation may be
permissible. If a president did later decide to make exceptions to the
75

The answer could be intermediate review for all laws implicating sexual orientation, strict
scrutiny for all laws implicating sexual orientation, or middle tier review for some kinds of laws and
strict scrutiny for others.
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administration’s new concept of equality, he could make refinements
without disavowing the principle as a whole.
For our purposes, this shift in legal terminology and mechanism should
be seen for what it was, namely, the announcement of a major change in
enforcement policy and the development of a theory of equality with wider
implications. The fact that an executive-made right looks different from a
juridically-constructed right affects its scope and effectiveness, but should
never be mistaken for a lack of coherence or commitment. It is simply
evidence that a constitutional right in action looks different in the political
sphere than it does in the judicial sphere.
To see this potentially far-reaching effect on the scope of the right,
keep in mind that DOJ could have simply argued that DOMA reflected
anti-gay animus, without taking the additional position that sexual
orientation triggered heightened scrutiny. That position would have put it
squarely within Romer. But the administration wanted to put gay rights on
even sounder footing—to endorse that shining language in Lawrence that
gestured toward (but did not fully explicate) a more robust notion of civic
equality for sexual minorities. By adopting heightened scrutiny, the
administration signaled that the scope of equality should extend well
beyond a do-no-harm approach and should approximate something closer
to full participation in civic life. Citing the landmark sex equality ruling
Frontiero, the Attorney General argued that “there is a growing
acknowledgment that sexual orientation ‘bears no relation to ability to
perform or contribute to society.’”76
The president’s theory of equality did Lawrence one better in another
respect—institutionally—by inviting the Court to join hands with the
White House to promote equality, in the spirit of cooperation. This was
both opportunistic and likely to be effective, because the president: (1)
acted preemptively by removing the specter of executive-branch
repudiation of judge-created rights; (2) offered the Court political cover for
pro-gay decisions by taking the leadership position on these matters (and
thereby drawing some political reaction to Obama and his party); and (3)
presented jurists with more raw material with which to say that social
consensus had changed sufficiently that a jurisprudence of equality for
sexual minorities now made sense.
Where doctrinal space remains for the Court to act without altering
doctrine dramatically, and the executive branch has reason to believe the
Court might adopt its preferred view on rights, a facilitative orientation can
be more productive in creating a durable consensus over rights.77
76
Letter from Eric Holder, Atty. General, to Congress, supra note 55 (quoting Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973)).
77
A president can always claim later that the Supreme Court went off the rails, or did the right
thing but did not go far enough.
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Indeed, Holder’s letter reminded his audience that President Obama
had already taken a number of noteworthy actions to advance civic
equality for sexual minorities with the support of the American people. The
administration had secured the repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” on the
principle that “sacrifice, valor and integrity are no more defined by sexual
orientation than they are by race or gender, religion or creed.”78 If the
Supreme Court desired to fashion a socially responsive jurisprudence,79
then the administration offered material support for such a project.
In the meantime, much could be done within the president’s spheres of
influence on gay rights, while cases churned slowly through the legal
system. Given DOJ’s new imperative, regulations and policies that denied
rights or benefits on the basis of sexual orientation should be revisited
under the Attorney General’s directive, and if found wanting, revised or
reinterpreted. State laws that negatively impacted the rights of sexual
minorities now could be said to affect a national interest, namely the
federal constitutional principle of equal protection of the law, allowing
more frequent monitoring and intervention by the federal government in
state and local conflicts. DOJ’s theory of equality also empowered actors
within the administration—lawyers, appointees, or even just lower level
aides across a variety of departments—to fight to expand rights on behalf
of sexual minorities by enforcing agency rules or filing lawsuits.
Another reason for resorting to the intricacies of legal analysis to
justify the exercise of political discretion is to gain an offensive advantage:
gaps in judicial case law provide opportunity, political cover, and the raw
materials for decisive, and sometimes highly creative, political action. In
this instance, Holder argued that judicial inaction at the level of the
Supreme Court and at least one circuit court justified reconsideration of
enforcement policy and more robust presidential action. Along the way, he
recycled judicial language and past judicial rulings, adapting them toward
new goals, and indeed, on behalf of a more aggressive agenda on gay
rights.
Note, too, that Holder’s letter explicitly rejected appellate court
decisions that used rational basis scrutiny for sexual orientation. The
administration’s view was that any judicial ruling was outdated (or lacked
sufficient social foundation) to the extent it rested on assumptions
78

Letter from Eric Holder, Atty. General, to Congress, supra note 55.
There is some evidence that Justice Kennedy, for instance, is particularly sensitive to arguments
about having a socially responsive jurisprudence—i.e., interpretations of law that do not fall too far
outside of existing political and social sentiment, or hinder the development of such attitudes. See, e.g.,
Saiju George, On Liberty: The Moral Concepts of Justice Kennedy’s Jurisprudence (2014)
(unpublished Law School Student Scholarship Paper, on file with Seaton Hall Law School) (discussing
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)) (“Kennedy cites to the ‘evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society,’ social science research, and international law to provide
‘objective referents’ for the moral content of liberty.”).
79
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articulated in Bowers v. Hardwick and later overturned by Lawrence.80
Though the Supreme Court had not yet determined the full scope of either
Lawrence or its repudiation of Bowers, the Obama administration
confidently did so: rulings adverse to gay rights that invoked Bowers were
tainted, Holder stated, and DOJ now read Lawrence as having announced
general principles of liberty and equality that must be implemented as a
matter of law. DOJ lawyers would no longer cite Bowers as precedent nor
adopt its claim that rational basis review was the appropriate baseline for
sexual orientation-dependent laws.
Moreover, as a matter of presidential policy, lawyers rejected the
“procreational responsibility” justification for DOMA as “unreasonable,”
instead embracing the immutability of sexual orientation as most
compatible with “recent social science understandings.”81 The letter went
on to apply these principles to DOMA, finding the law wanting. Notably,
Holder cited statements in the legislative record “expressing moral
disapproval of gays and lesbians and their intimate and family
relationships—precisely the kind of stereotype-based thinking and animus
the Equal Protection Clause is designed to guard against.”82
This last bit served as the strongest evidence that a sex/sexual
orientation analogy drove at least some of the president’s theory of
equality. To the extent laws expressed hostility towards sexual minorities
or were based on unfounded generalizations about sexuality, they were
unconstitutional. In a footnote, Holder made clear that laws intended to
“correct” homosexual behavior as anti-social defied the state of modern
science: “some of the discrimination has been based on the incorrect belief
that sexual orientation is a behavioral characteristic that can be changed or
subject to moral approbation.”83

80
Recall that the Lawrence Court explicitly overruled Bowers precisely because it lacked social
grounding. First, The Bowers ruling’s claim that anti-sodomy laws had “ancient roots” was erroneous.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 570 (2003). Rather, the decision’s “historical premises are not
without doubt and, at the very least, are overstated.” Id. at 571. Second, the number of anti-sodomy
laws in the United States had in fact dwindled. Id. at 572. That fact, coupled with a strong pattern of
non-enforcement of those laws, suggested a weakening even of contemporary norms. Id. Third, Bowers
had been eroded by not only subsequent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, but also that of the
European Court of Human Rights. See id. at 573 (detailing the case of an adult male resident of
Northern Ireland who was denied his right to engage in consensual homosexual conduct. The European
Court of Human Rights held that the laws proscribing the conduct were invalid under the European
Convention on Human Rights).
81
Letter from Eric Holder, Atty. General, to Congress, supra note 55.
82
Id.
83
Id.

30

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:1

E. The Vice-President and President Offer a Popular Defense of Equality
On May 4, 2012, Meet the Press host Mark Gregory asked VicePresident Joe Biden for his view on same-sex marriage. “What this is all
about is a simple proposition,” he answered. “Who do you love, and will
you be loyal to the person you love?”84 Pressed further, Biden clarified that
“[t]he president sets the policy” but that he personally was “absolutely
comfortable with the fact that men marrying men, women marrying
women, and heterosexual men and women marrying one another are
entitled to the same exact rights, all the civil rights, all the civil liberties.”85
Biden’s comments, though couched as unofficial, amounted to a
powerful statement about equality, one that rendered the stakes in the
simple terms of affection, devotion, and equal regard. His conception of
equality also seemed unequivocal in that “the same exact rights” must be
extended to same-sex couples for their commitments to satisfy
constitutional demands.
Although Biden’s endorsement of gay marriage was unscripted,
President Obama’s public announcement five days later was both polltested and carefully orchestrated. The President sat down with Robin
Roberts in an exclusive interview for Good Morning America. In
announcing his support for same-sex marriage for the first time, Obama
made three noteworthy moves. First, like Biden, he characterized the
principle as one of basic “fairness, and treating everybody as equals.” He
further elaborated the point that equality must be forward-looking and
practical by referencing his own children, saying a ban on same-sex
marriage “doesn’t make sense” to them because it treated gay parents of
their friends differently from their own parents.86
Second, Obama defended the principle in explicitly religious terms,
required by the example of “Christ sacrificing himself on our behalf,” as
well as “the Golden Rule,”87 that is, the injunction to treat others as one
would like to be treated. This offered a moral content to the principle of
equality beyond that of secular requirements to treat people fairly, and it
84
BECKER, supra note 37, at 288–89. As Becker tells it, the president’s aides were hoping for
greater control over the timing of the president’s statements and felt rushed to hurry his own views into
public so as not to give the impression of “leading from behind.” To some extent, this will always be
true, but any political and legal gains to be had from conveying firm leadership on an issue can be
dissipated by the impression that one feels forced to act by circumstance rather than out of principle.
85
Felicia Sonmez, Biden ‘Comfortable’ with Same-Sex Marriage, WASH. POST (May 7, 2012),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/biden-comfortable-with-same-sex-marriage/2012/05/06
/gIQASQDf7T_story.html?utm_term=.84164dee6b7a.
86
BECKER, supra note 37, at 296.
87
Id. The Golden Rule, a Christian formulation of equality, is attributed to a saying of Jesus: “So
always treat others as you would like them to treat you; that is the Law and the Prophets.” Matthew
7:12.
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also presented an opposing moral discourse to counter the religioustraditionalist view of heterosexual marriage as sacrosanct. In fact, refusing
to cede the moral terrain, the president claimed that support for same-sex
marriage is “consistent with our best and in some cases our most
conservative values, sort of the foundation of what made this country
great.”88
Together, Obama’s appeal to religious and ethical sources of law
obviously went beyond what judges would generally do today in their
positivist formulations of the Equal Protection Clause. But his rhetoric also
simplified the stakes, rendering them more easily understood by nonlawyers and grounding them in older traditions. Even if judges declined to
treat the principle of egalitarianism in such moral terms, the president’s
own language helped pave the way for broader social support for an
outcome that benefited sexual minorities.
Third, Obama engaged in jurisprudential bootstrapping, leveraging
gains in other social domains on gay rights to help advance a theory of
equality that encompassed same-sex marriage. He said:
When I think about—those soldiers or airmen or marines
or—sailors who are out there fighting on my behalf—and
yet, feel constrained, even now that ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’
is gone, because—they’re not able to—commit themselves in
a marriage. At a certain point I’ve just concluded that—for
me personally, it is important to go ahead and affirm that—I
think same-sex couples should be able to get married.89
There are several smaller moves that make up the bootstrapping
argument. First, changes in military policy should be treated as evidence of
social progress. Second, that progress was incomplete in other domains.
Third, social progress in the military domain justified further legal gains in
non-military domains, including in those not directly controlled by the
president (i.e., state laws governing marriage).90
Still, all three facets of Obama’s primetime articulation of popular
egalitarianism struck a principled stance while accounting for strategic
concerns. The most immediate concern was the president’s reelection
efforts, for he and others worried that supporting same-sex marriage might
depress turnout among socially conservative voters in the AfricanAmerican and Hispanic communities, as well as among white working
88

Id.
Transcript: Robin Roberts ABC News Interview With President Obama, supra note 72.
90
As a matter of pure logic, it needn’t follow that legal changes in one policy mandate change in
another policy. The contexts may be so dramatically different that legal changes are unsuitable in some
contexts given different policy goals; or perhaps it is a question of who gets to decide. Here, the
bootstrapping argument is therefore a way of blurring differences, and overcoming these objections by
stressing the same social condition that ought to be given primary importance in decision making.
89
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class Catholics. By couching his support for same-sex marriage in
explicitly ethical and religious terms, by appealing to family and
traditionalism, and by referring to the importance of fairness for military
families, Obama hoped to minimize any political costs associated with
supporting a broader notion of equality.
His overall presentation appeared to follow the advice of advisors who
believed that Obama had been out-of-step with his own base on same-sex
marriage, that many Republicans themselves were becoming increasingly
ambivalent about the issue, and that more political and legal gains could be
made by staying slightly ahead of the curve because same-sex marriage
would someday become the law of the land.92 In other words, decisive
leadership by the president could help establish the right to same-sex
marriage on stable footing in the law and society as a whole, while
persuadable voters would likely acquiesce to that outcome at some point.
With internal DOJ obstacles removed to full-throated development of a
new conception of equality, and with the President’s and Vice-President’s
powerful endorsements of same-sex marriage as a matter of national legal
concern, the table was now set for a vigorous display before the courts.
II. FROM WINDSOR TO OBERGEFELL: AN OPPORTUNITY REALIZED
Well before the same-sex marriage rulings, other decisions by the
Supreme Court had hastened, rather than arrested, this trend in rights
development. From Romer onward, the justices had repeatedly rejected
anti-gay laws, often on incompletely theorized accounts of equality,
substantive rights, and without agreeing to the proper doctrinal framework.
Critically, Lawrence not only struck down laws that criminalized
consensual sex between partners of the same sex, but also swept away
Bowers, along with its associated arguments that moral opprobrium alone
was sufficient to treat gay people unfairly. The cumulative effect of this
jurisprudence had been to invite political actors—not just grassroots
activists and lawyers but also presidential actors—into the fray to do more
to protect the rights of sexual minorities. With the previous
administration’s theory of equality repudiated as it related to same-sex
marriage, the Obama administration obliged by joining forces with promarriage advocates before the courts. That involvement had a profound
impact on how jurists perceived the national stakes of their interpretation
of the Equal Protection Clause.
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BECKER, supra note 37, at 294.
One of those advisors was Ken Mehlman, an openly gay Republican who founded Project
Right Side, an organization that strove to convince Republicans that gay marriage was consistent with
conservatism and made for good politics. His advice to Obama about how to talk about same-sex
marriage was based in part on polling. See id. at 289–96.
92
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The gay marriage decisions by the Supreme Court—first Windsor, then
Obergefell—appeared to vindicate the administration’s legal position.
Those judicial rulings, coming on the heels of a major shift by the
executive branch, signaled to the public that, just as the president had
claimed, fundamental constitutional rights were at stake in the battle over
gay marriage. Importantly, popular support for the pro-marriage position
did not noticeably erode after the Windsor ruling or after the increase in
public scrutiny of the Obama administration’s siding with pro-marriage
forces. If that had occurred, it might have caused aides to wonder whether
a jurisprudence that encompassed same-sex marriage was socially
untenable. To the contrary, lower courts and many ordinary people treated
that ruling as consistent with the view that DOMA amounted to
unjustifiable discrimination.93
A. The Windsor Brief: DOJ Makes Its Case
On February 22, 2013, Solicitor General Donald Verrilli, Jr., filed the
government’s brief in the Windsor case. For the first time, the Obama
administration advanced its theory of Equal Protection of the Laws to
require marriage for gay and lesbian couples.94 That brief largely tracked
Holder’s letter, and in recounting the procedural history of the case,
devoted two full paragraphs to the president’s changed legal position. This
recitation emphasized several themes discussed earlier: a principled, goodfaith reevaluation of the constitutionality of DOMA in light of changed
social conditions; certitude on the part of administration lawyers that
DOMA now violated the ideal of equality; and respect for both Congress
and the judiciary through the president’s decision to stop defending
DOMA in the courts while pressing for the Supreme Court to render “a
definitive verdict against the law’s constitutionality.”95
Notably, the brief argued that social conditions now favored the
recognition of gay marriage as a constitutional right.96 First, sufficiently
93

Polls showed waning support for DOMA-type laws even before the Court’s Windsor decision.
E.g., Jonathan Capehart, Americans are Done With DOMA, WASH. POST (Feb. 19, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/2013/02/19/americans-are-done-with-doma/.
Polls afterward have not shown a backlash to the Court’s involvement on this issue. E.g., Susan Page,
Poll: Support for Gay Marriage Hits High After Ruling, USA TODAY (July 1, 2013),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/07/01/poll-supreme-court-gay-marriageaffirmative-action-voting-rights/2479541/; William Saletan, Anti-Gay is Yesterday, SLATE (June 26,
2013), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/frame_game/2013/06/gay_marriage_polls_and
_public_opinion_the_supreme_court_s_rulings_upheld.html.
94
Brief for the United States on the Merits Question at *12, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct.
2675 (Feb. 22, 2013) (No. 12-307), 2013 WL 683048.
95
Id. at *5.
96
See id. at *12–16 (“There is broad scientific and medical consensus that sexual orientation is
typically not a voluntary choice, and that efforts to change an individual's sexual orientation are
generally futile and potentially harmful. In any event, as long as it distinguishes a group, a
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oppressive conditions against sexual minorities persisted, justifying not
only enhanced doctrinal tools such as “heightened scrutiny” by the courts
but also a more robust jurisprudence of equality and liberty.97 Going well
beyond Holder’s letter to Congress, the Solicitor General’s brief recounted
all of the historical forms of anti-gay discrimination, with an emphasis on
governmental actions to intimidate and subordinate sexual minorities: antisodomy laws, anti-gay employment and immigration laws, widespread
incidence of hate crimes, unequal child custody laws, unfair police
enforcement of criminal laws, and ballot initiatives repealing legal
protections for gays and lesbians.98 While defenders of DOMA minimized
the duration and significance of this history of discrimination, the Solicitor
General urged the High Court to see that “given its breadth and depth, the
undisputed twentieth-century discrimination has lasted long enough” to
merit enhanced protections for sexual minorities.99
Second, insisting that sexual orientation “bears no relation to ability to
perform or contribute to society,” Verilli’s brief pointed to two sources of
new information: (1) more recent, considered scientific views of
homosexuality; and (2) the President’s own actions to end the military’s
ban on service by gay Americans. The brief quoted the American
Psychiatric Association’s position statement that “homosexuality per se
implies no impairment in judgment, stability, reliability, or general social
or vocational capabilities.”100 Given this social-scientific fact, the
government argued, sexual orientation should be legally treated like other
suspect classifications (i.e., gender, race, religion), in that one’s sexual
preference “bears no inherent relation to a person’s ability to participate in
or contribute to society.”101
In the same vein, “the broad consensus in the scientific community
was that, for the vast majority of people (gay and straight alike), sexual
orientation is not a voluntary choice” and that “efforts to change an
individual’s sexual orientation are generally futile and potentially
dangerous to an individual’s well-being.”102 For these reasons, the
administration argued that sexual orientation is an “obvious, immutable, or
distinguishing characteristic” meriting strict scrutiny.103

characteristic may support application of heightened scrutiny even if - as with illegitimacy or alienage it is subject to change or not readily visible.”).
97
Id. at *5.
98
Id. *22–27.
99
Id. at *27.
100
Id. at *28 (quoting American Psychiatric Ass’n, Position Statement on Homosexuality and
Civil Rights (1973), reprinted in 131 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 497 (1974)).
101
Id. at *28.
102
Id. at *31.
103
Id. at *31–32.
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Additionally, government lawyers made the identical jurisprudential
bootstrapping argument that President Obama himself used in his public
words on gay marriage and Holder previewed in his letter to Congress,
namely, that the end of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” provided a reason to
vindicate the pro-gay marriage view. That Congress and the Obama
administration ended the discriminatory practice should be taken as proof
that scientific judgments about homosexuality have also been embraced by
society at large, even among some of its more conservative institutions.
Verilli’s brief quoted the President’s remarks during the signing of the
repeal: “[V]alor and sacrifice are no more limited by sexual orientation
than they are by race or by gender or by religion or by creed.”104 This
amounted to a political judgment as much as an institutional and cultural
one, but as far as the administration was concerned, it was a judgment that
should now be generalized as a legal one.
Third, the United States rebutted the argument of DOMA’s defenders
that social conditions did not yet support “experimentation” with marriage
as a matter of judicial intervention.105 In other words, they insisted that the
courts should defer to Congress’s judgment that such rights should be
developed on a state-by-state basis. But as the Solicitor General argued,
this kind of prudential argument has been raised before in other contexts
such as school desegregation—and usually rejected when the rights of
national citizenship are at stake.106 The brief also made an interesting
fairness argument: DOMA was not crafted as a “temporary” or
“provisional” law,107 and it contained no sunset provision. Given DOMA’s
harshness, the argument to “proceed with caution” appeared to be an effort
to indefinitely deny the rights of a political minority.
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Id. at *28. In President Obama’s original remarks, he went on to say that gay soldiers have
always served with honor and distinction; the only thing that changed was they could now do so
openly: “There can be little doubt there were gay soldiers who fought for American independence, who
consecrated the ground at Gettysburg, who manned the trenches along the Western Front, who stormed
the beaches of Iwo Jima. Their names are etched into the walls of our memorials. Their headstones dot
the grounds at Arlington.” Barack Obama, Remarks by the President and Vice President at Signing of
the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010 (Dec. 22, 2010), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/
the-press-office/2010/12/22/remarks-president-and-vice-president-signing-dont-ask-dont-tell-repeal-a.
In this way, Obama orally rewrote sexual minorities back into the constitutional history of this country.
He would go further, situating his theory of equality within an older view of pluralism: “For we are not
a nation that says, ‘don’t ask, don’t tell.’ We are a nation that says, ‘Out of many, we are
one.’ (Applause.) We are a nation that welcomes the service of every patriot. We are a nation that
believes that all men and women are created equal. (Applause.) Those are the ideals that generations
have fought for. Those are the ideals that we uphold today.” Id.
105
Brief for the United States on the Merits Question, supra note 94, at *50–51.
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Id. at *50.
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Id. at *50–51.
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B. Windsor Vindicates the Government’s Position
On March 27, 2013, the Supreme Court ruled for Edith Windsor, who
had been married to a woman under New York law and was subsequently
denied a spousal deduction on her federal taxes due to DOMA.108 Justice
Kennedy’s opinion declaring DOMA to be a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause characterized New York’s samesex marriage law as an effort “to correct what its citizens and elected
representatives perceived to be an injustice that they had not earlier known
or understood.”109 By creating the institution of same-sex marriage, New
York “conferred upon [these couples] a dignity and status of immense
import.”110 DOMA interfered with a state’s traditional power over marriage
and denied these couples the status and dignity conferred by law. Notably,
Justice Kennedy’s opinion treated marriage not as a static institution, but
rather as a complex, cultural institution that has evolved with time.111
Although the Supreme Court declined advocates’ invitation to call
sexual orientation a suspect classification, it did find several points of
concord with the administration. First, the Solicitor General had argued
that DOMA denied the effects of “state-recognized marital relationships
across the entire spectrum of federal law.”112 The Court agreed, noting in
Windsor that DOMA “enacts a directive applicable to over 1,000 federal
statutes and the whole realm of federal regulations. And its operation is
directed to a class of persons that the laws of New York, and of 11 other
States, have sought to protect.”113
Second, the Court emphasized the dignitary and tangible harms of
DOMA to families, and especially the children of same-sex parents. Justice
Kennedy wrote that the federal law “humiliates tens of thousands of
children now being raised by same-sex couples” and “makes it even more
difficult for the children to understand the integrity and closeness of their
own family and its concord with other families in their community and in
their daily lives.”114 He also stressed the “financial harm to the children of
same-sex couples.”115 As the Solicitor General’s brief had emphasized, the
denial of benefits “undermines the efforts of same-sex couples to raise
their children, hindering rather than advancing any interest in promoting
child welfare.”116 To be sure, the administration’s brief was not the only
108

United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682 (2013).
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one that made these points, but DOJ’s stature as a respected repeat player
in the High Court gave its characterization of the law’s effects great
credibility.
Beyond grounding its decision in the social conditions in which
marriage actually operates for thousands of families, the Court’s actions
helped to present a unified front that marriage equality was a matter of
national significance and constitutional dimension. The administration’s
repudiation of DOMA appeared to be vindicated by the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Windsor, which seemed jurisprudentially cautious at the time, for
it did not give a ringing endorsement of same-sex marriage as a substantive
right.117 Instead, the Justices simply asked whether federal law could treat
lawfully married same-sex couples differently from opposite-sex couples.
The decision did give the Obama administration considerable useful
material for the promotion of sexual orientation-based equality if it chose
to do so. If anything, the Court’s decision signaled to the president that (a)
the Court would not object to the president’s far-reaching theory of
equality and (b) the Justices would give the administration both time and
resources to advance a pro-rights agenda. Rather than create obstacles to
the President’s theory of equality, Windsor’s selective judicial ratification
of the administration’s position hastened executive-based lawmaking in
this area.
C. Post-Windsor Actions by the Executive Branch
During the period between the two gay marriage decisions, executive
branch officials took aggressive steps to lay down a firmer foundation for
same-sex marriage. Collectively, these actions responded to party pressures
and movement goals, but did so in a way that indicated the broader
objective of constitutional transformation rather than the mere satisfaction
of constituent interests. After Windsor, presidential actors repeatedly and
expressly relied on the Supreme Court’s language and reasoning for their
own ends, seeking to entrench a gay marriage-friendly conception of
equality.
1. Holder’s Speech to HRC
On February 8, 2014, Attorney General Holder gave a speech to the
Human Rights Campaign (HRC), the nation’s largest gay rights
organization, as a way of signaling continued support by the President for a

117
The closest the Court came to doing so was one line that cited Lawrence v. Texas and this
characterization of same-sex marriage: “[t]he differentiation demeans the couple, whose moral and
sexual choices the Constitution protects, see Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558, 123 S. Ct. 2472, and whose
relationship the State has sought to dignify.” Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694.
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broadened theory of equality.
By giving this speech before such a
prominent group, Holder acted as a kind of political patron for HRC’s legal
ideas and the social movement associated with its work. Holder’s actions
both authorized and mainstreamed their grassroots labors, nurturing
intellectual and political relationships that valued a theory of equality that
encompassed gay rights.119
During Holder’s widely-publicized speech,120 he first noted the role of
HRC and the gay rights movement in promoting “opportunity and equal
justice under law.”121 He said that “[f]or President Obama, for me, and for
our colleagues at every level of the Administration,” LGBT rights
remained “a top priority.”122 Holder vowed that any legal changes on this
front would be “historic, meaningful, lasting change.”123
Importantly, Holder also took credit for progress on gay marriage and
offered a defense of presidential leadership. He reminded the audience that
executive action, backed by social activism,124 had led to the disavowal of
DOMA, and eventually, the Windsor ruling. A belief in “our common
humanity” animated the work of the DOJ across a variety of issues,
including the enforcement of the Violence Against Women Act and the
Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Act.125 The
administration’s theory of equality, which now encompassed marriage
rights for gay couples, should be seen as opening “a new frontier in the
fight for civil rights.”126
118

Eric Holder to Extend Benefits to Same-Sex Couples, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 8, 2014),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/eric-holder-extend-benefits-same-sex-couples-article1.1606971.
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Laudatory appearances of this sort by high-ranking political and legal officers bring attention
to a cause, prime the pump for talented lawyers and activists, and raise the profile of a social group or
movement. Then-Attorney General Ed Meese’s speech before a young Federalist Society paid similar
dividends for the conservative legal movement. See STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE
CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW (2009); ANN
SOUTHWORTH, LAWYERS OF THE RIGHT: PROFESSIONALIZING THE CONSERVATIVE COALITION 134–36
(2008). President Trump’s Attorney General Jeff Sessions performed a similar function recently when
he spoke at a meeting of the Alliance Defending Freedom, a Christian legal advocacy group that has
been pushing exemptions to LGBT anti-discrimination laws and a right of conscience not to participate
in gay marriages. See Laura Jarrett, AG Sessions under fire for closed-door speech to Alliance
Defending Freedom, CNN (July 13, 2017, 10:58 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/07/12/politics/jeffsessions-alliance-defending-freedom-summit/index.html.
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Then, the Attorney General announced it would be taking specific
steps to “advance” the “fundamental truth” of equality “and to give real
meaning to the Windsor decision.” DOJ would issue “a new policy
memorandum that will—for the first time in history—formally instruct all
Justice Department employees to give lawful same-sex marriages full and
equal recognition, to the greatest extent possible under the law.”127
At a crucial moment in his performance, Holder went out of his way to
acknowledge the gay rights movement as a natural successor to the black
civil rights movement of the 1960s, and stated that the stakes over the
struggle for same-sex marriage “could not be higher.”128 No more
extravagant call could be made to draw together members of the
Democratic Party’s traditional base to forge a broad coalition to do the
hard work of egalitarianism:
[G]ay and straight, bisexual and transgender. Black and
white. Young and old—whether they live in Washington or
Wyoming; Massachusetts or Missouri. Whether they work in
schools or restaurants—on Wall Street or Main Street. And
whether they contribute to our nation as doctors or service
members; as businesspeople or public servants; as scientists
or as Olympic athletes.129
This statement captured the administration’s intention to harness the
power of popular sovereignty to promote a vigorous, presidentiallydirected conception of equality—through interest group politics,
bureaucratic resources, and the rule of law.
The purpose of this historical comparison would soon become
apparent: to help justify DOJ’s function as an engine for transformative
legal change. “[T]he Justice Department’s role in confronting
discrimination must be as aggressive today as it was in Robert Kennedy’s
time,” Holder stated.130 Most Americans, especially those committed to
social justice, remembered the 1960s as an exemplar of executive branch
leadership and legal wisdom on matters of equality. That institutional
history and example had to be repeated. Holder closed by committing the
127

Id.
Id. A black Attorney General making this historical claim helped to foster social support for
gay rights among the black civil rights community. Some black ministers opposed same-sex marriage
and rejected the analogy to the social movement of the 60s. See, e.g., Niraj Warikoo, Decrying Gay
Marriage, Black Pastors Join Legal Fight, USA TODAY (May 14, 2014, 6:30 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/05/14/michigan-same-sex-marriage-blackministers/9094721/ (reporting on a group of black ministers who filed amicus briefs disapproving of
gay marriage, with one minister saying that “[c]omparing the gay rights movement to black civil rights
is ‘ignorant and myopic’”).
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administration’s vast resources to promoting gay marriage: “[I]n every
courthouse, in every proceeding and in every place where a member of the
Department of Justice stands on behalf of the United States—they will
strive to ensure that same-sex marriages receive the same privileges,
protections, and rights as opposite-sex marriages under federal law.”131
2. The Feb. 10, 2014 Legal Memo
Two days later, by memo dated February 10, 2014, Attorney General
Holder celebrated the Windsor decision as “an enormous triumph for equal
protection under the law for all Americans,” and he issued further
guidelines to all department employees announcing how the ruling should
be implemented within the president’s sphere of influence.132 Consistent
with President Obama’s robust theory of equality, Holder announced
DOJ’s policy “to the extent federal law permits, to recognize lawful samesex marriages as broadly as possible.”133 Despite the fact that some states
still resisted the concept of gay marriage as a matter of morality and local
prerogative, the administration would enforce the general policy that “all
marriages [were] valid in the jurisdiction where the marriage was
celebrated.”134
The DOJ took these steps to enforce the Supreme Court’s ruling as
broadly as possible, in as many contexts as possible. In this way, the
president’s agents sought to disseminate and bureaucratize his theory of
equality. Although none of these programs were contested during the
Windsor litigation,135 federal benefit programs, victim compensation funds,
bankruptcy laws, Bureau of Prison policies, and ATF policies that turned
on marriage status would henceforth be interpreted to be available to samesex spouses on the same terms as to straight couples.136
Moreover, unless it was “infeasible,” the Attorney General directed
lawyers to take litigation positions such that any references to marriage in
federal laws be read to include valid same-sex marriages.137 Marital
privileges recognized during any judicial process would be treated the
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Memorandum from Att’y Gen. Eric Holder, Dep’t of Just., to All Department Employees,
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same.
In these ways, presidential action sought to alter the social
conditions in which the right to same-sex marriage would be ultimately
determined.
Soon enough, two cases, Obergefell v. Hodges and Hollingsworth v.
Perry, would give the administration a fresh opportunity to extend its new
approach to equality.139
3. DOJ’s Amicus Brief in Obergefell
The United States was not a party to either case, but decided to file an
amicus brief on behalf of the same-sex couples both times. In the
Hollingsworth case, the same-sex couples won in the Ninth Circuit on a
narrow ground. Instead of treating same-sex marriage as a fundamental
right or concluding that strict scrutiny was required any time the state used
sexual orientation as a classification, Judge Reinhardt’s ruling simply held
that Proposition 8, which had overturned the California Supreme Court’s
pro-same-sex marriage ruling, stripped a minority group of its rights
without a rational justification.140
If possible, DOJ’s amicus brief in Hollingsworth sounded even more
forceful than the one filed in Windsor, especially in its insistence that
equality represented a paramount national concern and priority for the
Obama administration. The brief announced at the outset, “The United
States has a strong interest in the eradication of discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation.”141 First, by making same-sex marriage a national
priority, the administration gave the Court political cover for a more
generous reading of the Constitution. Second, by repeatedly quoting the
Court’s own words in Windsor back to the Justices, the Solicitor expressed
substantive agreement with the Court’s broader language and rationales of
equality and liberty. DOJ lawyers drastically minimized the tepid rational
basis approach exemplified by the holding in Romer v. Evans, leading
instead with plentiful references to Windsor’s concern for the dignity and
status of civil marriage, language about the connections between “personal
decisions” and “liberty” from Lawrence, and Loving v. Virginia’s
declaration that “the freedom to marry has long been recognized as . . .
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness.”142 Third, the brief reassured
138

Id. at 2–4.
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the Justices that the Obama administration would vigorously enforce a
strong opinion in favor of same-sex couples.
While the government’s brief repeated many of the doctrinal
arguments from its brief in Windsor, it also bolstered those arguments with
the work of historians and other scholars who work on human rights and
sexuality. For instance, lawyers drew from the work of Dale Carpenter
documenting official policies of hostility towards lesbian and gay people,
such as civil institutionalization, sterilization, and castration.143 They also
cited Michael Klarman and Robert Wintemute for the proposition that
“efforts to combat discrimination against lesbian and gay people have
engendered significant political backlash,” which demonstrated their
relative political powerlessness and warranted judicial intervention to
secure their rights.144 In this way, the government offered resources to the
Justices for the finding of accurate social facts about the status of sexual
minorities in America, as well as context for understanding the social
meaning and effects of bans on same-sex marriage.
A culturally adaptive reading of the Constitution made the most sense,
the government argued, because “earlier generations may have failed” to
even consider the possibility of these kinds of unions. One line in the brief
exemplified the government’s plea to take the social context into account:
“[I]t is not the Constitution that has changed, but the knowledge of what it
means to be gay or lesbian.”145
A. Obergefell as Institutional Consensus
On June 26, 2015, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in
Obergefell. That ruling, authored by Justice Kennedy, articulated a concept
of marriage that implicated both principles of liberty and equality. Notably,
in describing marriage as an institution of constitutional dimension, the
opinion cited the administration’s recounting of all of the ways that the
states “have throughout our history made marriage the basis for an
expanding list of governmental rights, benefits, and responsibilities.”146 In
fact, Justice Kennedy wrote, “[t]he States have contributed to the
fundamental character of the marriage right by placing that institution at
the center of so many facets of the legal and social order.”147 That is,
constitutional adjudication had to grapple with marriage as a contemporary
institution rather than as a social good that was frozen in time.
143
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While the Justices did not go as far in Obergefell as President Obama’s
preferred theory of equality,148 neither did they decisively reject it. The
Supreme Court found a fundamental right to same-sex marriage, offering
clarity as to its nature in a way that will aid proponents of the new right
while antagonizing opponents. And critically for our purposes, leaving the
scope of equality partly unresolved gave committed political actors room
to push further.
Decisive presidential action on this front nevertheless encouraged the
Justices to take that final step toward a new social convergence over rights.
After all, having ruled in Windsor that the federal government’s treatment
of same-sex marriages implicated both tangible and symbolic
constitutional interests, it would have been a tall order to say in Obergefell
that states suddenly had a legitimate reason to violate those exact interests.
While a technical possibility as a matter of cool logic, a secondary-right
approach to gay marriage (equality is required only if a state chooses to
offer gay marriage) would have undermined the general, autonomy-based
terms of Windsor.
To be sure, there are few guarantees in life. It was theoretically
possible for the Court to conclude in Obergefell that no substantive right to
gay marriage existed as such or that states enjoy a power to regulate the
moral welfare of the people in a way that is not entrusted to the federal
government. But doing so would have risked inflaming both sides in the
dispute rather than ratifying what appeared to be a broadening political
settlement of the issue, one in which a president had made a decisive
intervention. The Obama administration’s public repudiation of DOMA
confirmed to the High Court that public opinion had shifted significantly
on gay marriage, clarified the constitutional stakes raised by the question,
and gave the Justices a measure of political cover to strike down federal
and state DOMA’s. DOJ lawyers cited earlier judicial rulings to justify a
broadened view of equality, and their actions, in turn, gave the Justices the
social support to expand their own jurisprudence.
Presidential leadership on gay marriage did not guarantee the outcome
in Obergefell, but it did help alter the social conditions in which jurists
wrestled with the issue, making a pro-gay rights outcome far more likely.
Not only would there be no risk of presidential defiance of such a ruling,
President Obama offered to serve as an active partner to enforce
egalitarianism as a national principle—including by defending that right
against recalcitrant states. Additionally, the administration’s aggressive
posture within its own domain took maximum advantage of the role of
148
For instance, Justice Kennedy’s opinion did not state that heightened review was required for
all laws implicating sexual orientation. Nor did he spell out any substantive constitutional right to
marriage, finding only that the federal government could not treat same-sex marriages differently once
states decided to sanction such unions.
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time to ground its theory of equality in areas that might not have been the
subject of immediate litigation. The more areas in which the administration
could codify policies and practices that extended benefits and protections
on the basis of gay marriage, the more the social terrain would necessarily
be changed each time a future court faced a question involving questions of
sexual orientation.
Instead of operating in a social environment devoid of law, the
Supreme Court in Obergefell had to contend with the prospect that a
negative ruling, one that read the Constitution in a parsimonious fashion,
would make the judiciary appear out of step with popular sentiment. This
was not merely a matter of following what is fashionable, but actually goes
to the legitimacy of the court, for rulings that are too far out of the
consensus—that begin to appear socially implausible, taking both the
present and future into account—risk making the courts appear culturally
irrelevant. After all, the lesson drawn from Bowers was that a decision
whose historical foundations were suspect to begin with, and whose logic
and social support later “sustained serious erosion,” would start to cast
doubt on the Court’s own wisdom and authority.149
In this case, a decision the other way could certainly have been
defended in the abstract or based on older, but perhaps outdated, social
views of marriage, but how long would such a ruling last before pressure to
revisit its reasoning reemerged? Moreover, if the Supreme Court refused
the president’s invitation to lay down a cooperative vision of sexual
equality on this issue, the Court would have ceded the ground of principle
to the presidency, rather than claiming some credit for keeping the
principle of egalitarianism both salient and effective.
When the Obergefell ruling came down in a way that established a
fundamental right to same-sex marriage, it then recognized that a social
consensus had been reached among national institutions on this matter.
Only then could it be fairly said that a majority’s political preferences
became established initially as social, and ultimately, constitutional norms.
Still, it should be said that a claim of convergence will eventually be tested
by dissenters, something all such claims to cultural governance must face.
How should we think about social convergence on constitutional
norms? Though influential, Robert Dahl’s work offers far too crude a
formula for why rulings by the Supreme Court might be considered
“majoritarian,” but he was absolutely right to treat the other branches of
the national government as essential parts of the social context in which
judicial decisions are made.150
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Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571–76 (2003).
Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National PolicyMaker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 281 (1957).
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The president seized a leadership role on gay marriage by endorsing
the work of activists;151 the Supreme Court approved that course of action
by authoring equality-based opinions, and Congress offered mostly
institutional acquiescence, especially after DOMA’s demise. Importantly,
the judicial outcome allowed both the Presidency and the judiciary to rise
to the occasion and join forces to establish new constitutional norms while
pursuing their own, separate institutional prerogatives. It gave President
Obama an opportunity to declare political victory, which he did by
wrapping his arm around the Obergefell ruling and treating it as a
vindication of his own leadership to transform individual rights,152 and
offered additional material—arguments, rationales, and momentum—for
whatever equality initiatives remained on his agenda.
One of those matters later turned out to be North Carolina’s HB2 law,
which required individuals to use bathrooms that corresponded to their sex
as identified on their birth certificate.153 Lawyers in the administration
subsequently drew on this approach to equality to find that such bathroom
laws constituted impermissible sex-based discrimination. By opening up
such new fronts in the battle over human sexuality and sex roles in society,
however, opponents of social progress-based theories of equality will have
new opportunities to challenge claims of social convergence over legal
norms.
III. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP OVER
RIGHTS
A. Neither Simple Obedience Nor Pure Politics
As the Obama administration’s experience with same-sex marriage
confirms, the dynamics surrounding the presidential creation of individual
rights are more complicated and far-reaching than most models of rights
151
In making this point, I do not mean to denigrate the work of activists, lawyers, and ordinary
citizens who toil on issues of rights. Quite the contrary: their activity is crucial to the formation of new
legal vocabulary, the pressuring of governmental institutions, and generation of momentum for legal
change. My point is simply that such efforts, if they are to produce lasting change, must be directed to
the gears of government as efficiently as possible, and that among the most influential factors in
judicial decision making are the views of the President and Congress.
152
President Obama called Jim Obergefell personally to congratulate him on the legal victory, and
in his speech publicly endorsed the ruling as a crucial step that “made our union a little more perfect.”
Clip of President Obama on Same-Sex Marriage Ruling, C-SPAN (June 26, 2015), http://www.cspan.org/video/?326809-1/president-obama-reaction-supreme-court-samesex-marriage-ruling.
He
called it a vindication of the principle of equal treatment of all people, “regardless of who they are or
who they love.” Id. More important, he took credit for defending that principle vigorously, before and
after the Supreme Court’s own episodic interventions. “My administration has been guided by that
idea,” Obama said, reminding the American people that his leadership has led to “real progress for
LGBT Americans in ways that were unimaginable not too long ago.” Id.
153
H.R. 2, 2016 Gen. Assemb., 2d Extra Sess. (N.C. 2016).
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currently allow. A conventional story about judicial supremacy affirms that
judges alone create rights, which political actors are then required to take
on as their own—but this explanation goes only so far. Such theories tend
to treat political actors as passive receptors for juridic theories of rights,
rather than active proponents of their own theories of rights. They are also
defective in a normative sense, by departing from the tradition of popular
sovereignty and the ideal of co-equal branches of government.
The executive branch has, in fact, internalized many methods of
interpreting the laws, by establishing the Department of Justice and the
White House Counsel’s Office, but also by creating legal departments
within most agencies to foster responsive and specialized legal advice. A
professional rule of law culture has been fostered by attorney-advisors,
past and present, who valorize service to the Office of the Presidency
rather than to individual presidents.154
Still, the simple account of constitutional law making does not fully
grasp the full range of choices facing political actors who might, but need
not always, resort to juridic language or methods to enforce individual
rights. There are times when progress on matters of rights can be made
more effectively when not cast explicitly in liberty or equality terms at
all.155 Presidents might tell the world they are not making rights but are
merely defending an “original” Constitution. This can be more of a
strategic ploy rather than an accurate description of their legal ambitions.
As already illustrated, the benefits from selective reliance on juridic
methods and from paying homage to the myth of judicial supremacy can be
partly political, and partly legal. Departures from legal methodology do not
always damage rights. Quite the contrary: being cognizant of political and
social conditions can more effectively secure rights for the long term.

154
See, e.g., Memorandum from David J. Barron, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice on Best Practices for OLC Legal Advice and Written Opinions (July 16, 2010),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/legacy/2010/08/26/olc-legal-advice-opinions.pdf (“OLC
opinions should consider and ordinarily give great weight to any relevant past opinions of Attorneys
General and the Office.”); Harold Hongju Koh, Protecting the Office of Legal Counsel from Itself, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 513, 516 (1993) (“On this point, the Office has tended to believe that its client is the
institutional presidency, not any particular President.”). To be sure, how a president makes use of such
legal advice is a different matter, and depends on his or her agenda and views about the relative
competencies of various legal advisors.
155
The rights of inmates and undocumented aliens come to mind. Rights discourse can galvanize
already sympathetic communities, but also trigger vehement reactions from citizens who will deny that
such groups should enjoy full or partial rights. This helps to explain why procedural approaches, with
their generalist structure and application, are frequently favored over substantive approaches, which
can highlight social group differences. See, e.g., Tammy W. Sun, Equality by Other Means: The
Substantive Foundations of the Vagueness Doctrine, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 149, 152 (2011)
(“Our system has striven rather unsuccessfully to minimize the potential for abuse primarily by erecting
safeguards that review prosecutorial and law enforcement decisions for adherence to procedural
values.”).
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At the same time, it would be a mistake to see presidential leadership
on rights as merely an unprincipled recapitulation of ordinary politics. It
involves sophisticated, popular law making—every bit as high-minded and
binding as juridical processes when it is successful. An executive-based
conception of rights will be powerfully shaped by political interests, but it
will also tend to have more integrity than one might expect of a mere
policy change. Such a right will be especially effective in areas within the
executive branch’s spheres of authority, since not every action or policy
will face judicial review.
An executive-based conception of a right often bears the hallmarks of
lasting decisions, usually through powerful articulations of legal principles
combined with strategies to entrench a presidential theory of rights across
multiple institutions and social domains. That way, a legal right can be
preserved by different kinds of departmental rules and organizational
practices (though it may be vulnerable to those separate dynamics as well).
Once an institutional convergence over rights has been reached, it can be
difficult to dislodge without expending significant political capital. A
robust executive defense of rights is never presented as merely the onetime satisfaction of narrow constituent interests, but rather as a position
informed by foundational values.
It is always theoretically possible for a new administration to alter its
views on the scope of any particular right,156 and this is an inherent
weakness in the model of presidential leadership. Nevertheless, there are
reasons to expect more continuity between administrations on rights than
one might think. The key is the degree to which a particular right can be
said to be well grounded as a social practice. Consider the following
factors that militate against full-bore reversal of executive-based rights
with each presidential succession:
1. Practical governance constrains the transformation of rights. If a new
party gains control of the Oval Office, its political prospects now turn
on the ability to govern rather than a capacity to undermine a political
regime. Thus, a successful leader will avoid taking unnecessary,
ideologically polarizing positions, especially those that strengthen the
hand of the party in the minority in terms of counter-mobilization and
distracting from a president’s priorities.
2. Rights in action are associated with constituencies. In the eight years
during which a party typically controls the presidency, the people may
become reliant on the right in question. Every right creates
156

For instance, the Trump administration has staked out different views about the proper scope
of voting rights, abortion rights, the rights of sexual minorities, religious exemptions to civil rights
laws, and perhaps others too.
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constituencies, and those constituencies may try to punish a president
and his party if they publicly oppose a cherished right. Parties, social
groups, and their allies use rights to increase electoral gains, either by
defending rights or challenging them.157
3. Rights are enmeshed in social reality through institutional practice. In
the meantime, a president has enjoyed some success entrenching his
view of the right in question by appointing ideologically friendly
judges, authoring executive orders, enacting regulations, authoring
policies and memos, creating new bureaucracies, or taking other
actions within his sphere of influence to disseminate and codify the
right.
4. Judicial endorsement of presidential action is the gold standard,
though legislative assent comes a close second. In the meantime,
courts may have explicitly embraced the legal views of the past
president during litigation, thereby adopting it as legal doctrine. Once
such socio-legal consensus is achieved, it becomes more difficult and
costly to disturb (in terms of bureaucratic and cultural resistance, as
well as political resources that could be spent elsewhere). In lieu of
judicial endorsement of a theory of rights, congressional approval can
help raise the costs of reversal by a president’s successor.158

157
Social Security offers the best historical example. As Franklin Roosevelt famously observed,
the goal of using the payroll tax mechanism was “to give the contributors a legal, moral, and political
right to collect their unemployment benefits.” ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, THE COMING OF THE NEW
DEAL, 1933–1935, at 308–09 (1958). He bet that “[w]ith those taxes in there, no damn politician can
ever scrap my social security program.” Id. The Republican White House and Republican-controlled
Congress are currently in the midst of testing this socio-legal insight as it relates to national healthcare:
whether the American people truly think of healthcare as a socially grounded right (something that has
obtained legal or, perhaps in the hopes of Obamacare’s most ardent defenders, a quasi-constitutional
status) or whether it is merely a socio-legal entitlement that can be curtailed or repealed whenever any
party wins one election cycle. See, e.g., Steve Benen, GOP senator: Health care coverage is ‘a
privilege,’ not a right, MSNBC (Oct. 2, 2017, 9:20 AM) (quoting one Republican Senator as saying, “I
think [healthcare is] probably more of a privilege [than a right].”). The Republican Party’s facility with
mobilizing gun rights constituencies is another, more recent illustration.
158
The Obama administration’s end to “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” certified by the military and
approved by Congress, embraced a theory of equality as it relates to sexual orientation in the military, a
domain in which courts have struggled to create enforceable rights. Later presidents might disagree, but
the costs of trying to reverse such a ban, given congressional and agency approval, is almost certainly
too high to pay. The issue of torture might be another area, where judicial norms against cruelty have
now been approved by Congress, which then allows advocates and elected officials to argue that the
issue has become “settled law.” See 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd (2012) (banning “cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment” of any prisoner of the U.S. government); Alexander Bolton, Top Senate
Republicans: Torture Ban is Settled Law, THE HILL (Jan. 25, 2017, 1:42 PM),
http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/316113-top-senate-republican-torture-ban-is-settled-law (“Those
issues are settled law. Congress has spoken.” (quoting Senator John Thune)).
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5. Not all presidential tactics are equal. Certain kinds of executive
actions are more easily reversed than others. An executive order can be
rescinded by a successor president and a legal opinion by the Office of
Legal Counsel can be recalled by the Attorney General, but that
assumes no significant constituencies have arisen that are dependent on
that right. It also assumes Congress has not codified the course of
action into law (and courts have not required that course of action as a
matter of law).

6. Rights transformations are usually asymmetrical. In the politics of
leadership, it looks worse to be a president who takes rights away as
opposed to one who gives new rights to the people, so we should
assume, absent an emergency, an asymmetrical quality to rights
discourse that favors the preservation or expansion of existing rights.159
Actions perceived as depriving a constituency of rights are expected to
be more costly,160 and if curtailment is successful, more susceptible to
reversal by successors or other institutions.
7. The degree of social grounding of rights is the ultimate test of
longevity. The more that an individual right can be entrenched across
governmental agencies, a variety of political and legal texts, and
bureaucratic practices, the more stable that right is. This is what it
means to put rights into action.
Keep in mind, too, the various ways that judicial interpretations of
rights are less stable and complete than commonly believed. Any judicial
declaration of rights must be enforced by others and is therefore subject to
fear of defiance in its very formulation. Furthermore, the fractured nature
159

For instance, Executive Order 9066, which created the mechanism for the wartime internment
of Japanese Americans, has damaged FDR’s historical reputation. Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg.
1407 (Feb. 19, 1942). Likewise, many will say that the authorization of torture permanently stains
George W. Bush’s presidency.
160
The Trump administration announced that it would retain the government workplace nondiscrimination rules that include sexual orientation established by President Obama. Jeremy W. Peters,
Obama’s Protections for L.G.B.T. Workers Will Remain Under Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2017),
https://mobile.nytimes.com/2017/01/30/us/politics/obama-trump-protections-lgbt-workers.html.
In
explaining its adherence to sexual orientation equality in this sphere, the White House statement cited
the fact that Trump “continues to be respectful and supportive of L.G.B.T.Q. rights, just as he was
throughout the election . . . . The president is proud to have been the first ever G.O.P. nominee to
mention the L.G.B.T.Q. community in his nomination acceptance speech, pledging then to protect the
community from violence and oppression.” Id. This and other episodes suggest there are several kinds
of constraints that can favor continuity of executive-based legal and constitutional norms: philosophical
agreement with a predecessor, reputation-enhancing benefits from appearing to be a strong leader not
beholden to party, broader cultural attitudes, party preferences, likelihood of backlash of reversal, the
desire to minimize distractions from other priorities.
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of litigation ensures that the content of individual rights will vary from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction—with more variation in controversial cases.
Injunctive relief must be closely tailored to the particularized injuries of
complainants after byzantine rules of standing are met (no such
jurisdictional or remedial rules govern changes in executive policy or
practice), and despite a recent willingness on the part of judges to grant
such relief, nationwide injunctions remain a controversial remedy, given
concerns about undue interference with national policies and the ease of
forum shopping.161
Violations of injunctions, too, are subject to rules requiring gradually
escalating pressure on recalcitrant government actors. By contrast, changes
in an administration’s executive orders, agency interpretations of the law
and Constitution, policies, guidelines, and enforcement practices have
broader reach than most judicial orders and are easier to accomplish. A
president also possesses more tools at his disposal to streamline a theory of
rights, especially within his spheres of influence.
One important clarification: My point here is not to suggest that a
president’s articulation of individual rights is always superior to judicial
interpretations or somehow immune to politics. To the contrary, my
argument concedes that politics infuse the making of rights from beginning
to end, and claims that presidential politics are sufficiently complex that
one should expect to find surprising areas of stability across time.
Even when a candidate from a different party wins the presidency
based on promises to undo his predecessor’s achievements, a successor
might find a more confined environment upon taking office. Efforts to
repeal, narrow, or undermine an inherited policy on rights may prove to be
more costly than originally anticipated or distracting to other priorities.
Loyalists of a prior regime may resist changes on ideological grounds.
Thus, outright repudiation of a legal right by a successor may be untenable,
and legal transformation, if it is to be undertaken by high officials, must be
done surreptitiously.
The Trump administration’s efforts to repeal Obamacare in 2017,
capped by the Senate’s failure to gain a majority vote to do so, offered a
stunning example of these lessons in action. For years, a number of
politicians had called for healthcare as a national right. After litigation
intended to upend the law mostly failed, President Obama declared victory
by saying, “In the United States, health care is not a privilege for the

161

For skeptical accounts of nationwide injunctions, see Getzel Berger, Nationwide Injunctions
Against the Federal Government: A Structural Approach, 92 N.Y.U.L. REV. (forthcoming 2017)
(manuscript at 2), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2931267; Samuel Bray,
Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 130 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017)
(manuscript at 3), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2864175.
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162

fortunate few, it is a right.”
Republicans regularly assailed the
Affordable Care Act on the campaign trail, but given the opportunity and
power to erase it legislatively, came face to face with the reality of
healthcare as a right: mobilized constituents angry over the loss of
coverage and rising costs, healthcare insurers concerned about the
economic uncertainties entailed in repeal, and medical providers worried
that the quality of care might worsen.
Efforts to erode healthcare as an individual right continue, but until
conservatives and libertarians can find a solution they can rally around,
erosion will have to be done through executive action alone. For instance,
President Trump suggested he might just let the system “collapse” from
neglect, perhaps by refusing to pay insurers on time, by not enforcing the
tax penalty for being uninsured, or even by spending less money on things
that affect how many people learn about available plans and sign up for
one of them.
The Trump administration’s initial approach to the Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) is another useful example. As a candidate,
Trump had vowed to immediately undo President Obama’s executive order
granting a stay of removal to this class of undocumented immigrants who
came as children.163 Because DACA created 800,000 beneficiaries, or
“Dreamers,” and those individuals enjoyed significant support among
Americans,164 Trump initially did not end DACA but instead made
Dreamers a priority for removal only if they committed a crime or engaged
in fraud.165 For nine months, any effort to undermine the status of
Dreamers could only be done covertly.
162

Scott Wilson & Ovetta Wiggins, Obama Defends Health-Care Law, Calling Health Insurance
‘A Right,’ WASH. POST. (Sept. 26, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-defendshealth-care-law-calling-health-insurance-a-right/2013/09/26/9e1d946e-26b8-11e3-b75d-5b7f66349852
_story.html?utm_term=.c32322178906.
163
See Serena Marshall, What Could Happen to DACA Recipients Under Donald Trump, ABC
NEWS (Nov. 16, 2016, 2:28 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/happen-daca-recipients-donaldtrump/story?id=43546706 (discussing Donald Trump’s campaign promises to end Obama’s executive
orders).
164
Fifty-eight percent of those polled think Dreamers should be allowed to stay and given a shot
at earning citizenship, while another eighteen percent support allowing them to stay but oppose
citizenship. Only fifteen percent believe they should be deported. Steven Shepard, Poll: Majority
(Sept.
5,
2017),
Opposes
Deporting
Dreamers,
POLITICO
https://www.politico.com/story/2017/09/05/poll-trump-deporting-daca-dreamers-242343.
165
Dreamers were made subject to the new rules that expand the list of grounds for removal,
including conviction “of any criminal offense,” commission of any act that could be “a chargeable
criminal offense,” “fraud in connection with any government matter,” or abuse of “any program related
to receipt of public benefits.” See Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec’y, U.S. Homeland Sec.,
Enforcement of the Immigration Laws to Serve the National Interest 2 (Feb. 20, 2017),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/17_0220_S1_Implementing-the-Presidents-BorderSecurity-Immigration-Enforcement-Improvement-Policies.pdf (urging Homeland Security personnel to
“prioritize” the removal of certain illegal aliens).
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After much internal debate, the White House announced it would be
phasing out the program over a six-month period to give Congress a
chance to fashion a legislative solution.166 Attorney General Jeff Sessions
argued that President Obama’s prior executive order was unconstitutional
and indefensible in court, and denied that an indispensable social good was
created by the program.167
Because President Trump’s decision suddenly altered the expectations
of Dreamers, he tried to shift the responsibility of maintaining the status
quo to Congress. This was always the part of his immigration policy most
likely to earn a legislative reversal, with some members of his own party
joining Democrats rebuking the President, advocacy groups promising to
tie up the change in litigation, and legislators promising bipartisan efforts
to pass a Dream Act. In fact, just days after Sessions announced the shift in
policy, President Trump undercut his own Attorney General’s position,
saying that he agreed with Democratic leaders that something needed to be
done to protect Dreamers.168
Thus, DACA poignantly illustrates precepts 2 and 5, that rights can
develop powerful constituencies and not all presidential actions are equal,
for Obama’s decision to take a controversial act based solely on the theory
of prosecutorial discretion rendered it more vulnerable to repudiation. At
the same time, DACA tests maxim 6, which posits that rights
developments are usually asymmetrical, as proponents of DACA now try
their best to ground Dreamers’ rights and benefits through more durable
processes of bicameralism and presentment.
To say that presidential views on certain rights can remain stable
across administrations does not mean that a president will always adopt the
more expansive rights interpretation every time. That would be an overly
deterministic account of how executive-created rights work. It simply
means that the social conditions favor respect for a right such that
deviations from that position would have to be justified and that the costs
of deviating from such a principle will have increased in important ways
166
Eliana Johnson, Trump Has Decided to End DACA, with 6-Month Delay, POLITICO (Sept. 4,
2017, 12:40 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/09/03/trump-dreamers-immigration-dacaimmigrants -242301.
167
Letter from Jefferson B. Sessions, Att’y Gen., to Elaine Duke, Acting Sec’y Homeland Sec.
(Sept. 4, 2017),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/17_0904_DOJ_AG-letterDACA.pdf.
168
Maggie Haberman & Yamiche Alcindor, Pelosi and Schumer Say They Have Deal With
Trump to Replace DACA, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/13/us/
politics/trump-dinner-schumer-pelosi-daca-obamacare.html. On September 14, 2017, President Trump
tweeted: “Does anybody really want to throw out good, educated and accomplished young people who
have jobs, some serving in the military? Really! . . . . They have been in our country for many years
through no fault of their own - brought in by parents at young age.” Donald Trump
(@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Sept. 14, 2017, 3:35 AM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump
/status/908278070611779585.
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from the previous status quo in which no expectation of rights existed.
Occasional exceptions from a binding norm are never the same as a denial
of the baseline existence of an authoritative principle.
The social realities involved in the making of rights are confirmed by
the manner in which wily advocates talk about particular controversies.
Astute participants in a constitutional debate speak with one eye on an
imaginary clock. Proponents of rights try to act as expeditiously as possible
to make reliance on rights part of their constituents’ social existence and to
maximize the advantages of path dependency. Opponents, too, see
themselves as working furiously to prevent a critical mass of citizens from
giving up on their narrower vision of rights. For instance, Obamacare’s
detractors sought to delay implementation of the plan and stoke support for
its repeal at every turn. They worried, justifiably, that once the rollout
occurred the right to healthcare would become ingrained as part of what
they called “a culture of dependence.”169
Despite the pejorative quality of these statements (intended to foster a
lingering sense of shame and illegitimacy), they nevertheless confirmed a
sense that once rights are granted and a constituency develops around such
a right, a contrary interpretation of law will be far more difficult to
dislodge. The same can be said of the social foundations of same-sex
marriage rights; the more that civilly recognized bonds of this nature
became a part of everyday life, the harder it would be to reverse this
dynamic without incurring major social, institutional, and political costs.
The gay marriage issue bears many of the indicators of a
transformation of an individual right that may prove to be lasting rather
than fleeting. For one thing, the pressure to resist development of this right
has seemingly reached its high point and begun to slide, whereas support
for the right has been swift, surprisingly broad-based, and sustainable in an
intergenerational way. Second, the weight of judicial decisions is markedly
one-sided, with rulings striking down state DOMA’s in liberal and
conservative jurisdictions across the country—culminating in Obergefell.
The emergence of a juridic resolution hinted at a broader popular
consensus, but more importantly, suggested a unifying way of thinking of
the constitutional stakes—one that became increasingly attractive to legal

169

See AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE THOUGHT IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, at lix (William F.
Buckley, Jr., ed., 2011) (describing welfare state generally as creating a “culture of dependence”);
Bobby Jindal, Declaration of Independence, Not Dependence, REDSTATE (July 3, 2012, 5:30 PM),
http://www.redstate.com/bobbyjindal/2012/07/03/declaration-of-independence-not-dependence
(arguing that Supreme Court’s healthcare ruling and Obama’s policies foster “culture of dependence”);
Merrill Matthews, We’ve Crossed the Tipping Point; Most Americans Now Receive Government
Benefits, FORBES (July 2, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/merrillmatthews/2014/07/02/wevecrossed-the-tipping-point-most-americans-now-receive-government-benefits/ (“But attitudes can
change once people are on the receiving end of benefits, even if they are owed those benefits.”).
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170

actors. Third, in both appearance and fact, judges could be said to have
followed a durable shift in public attitudes rather than trying to lead them.
None of this means that disagreement will disappear, for religious
dissent remains critical to a pluralist legal order. Efforts to strike the right
balance between equality and pluralism will continue. What it does mean is
that now that a right to same-sex marriage has been backed by a sitting
president and inscribed by the Court into its precedents, the costs of
resistance to the new constitutional norm go up considerably for
successors.171
B. Does Presidential Leadership Imply Judicial Subordination?
Recognizing that the modern presidency possesses great power to
transform individual rights does not relegate courts to an inferior position.
Instead, it simply recognizes several realities. First, each coordinate branch
has an independent duty to read and apply the Constitution. Presidential
leadership is merely the primary mechanism used by ideologically
committed executive branch officials to make changes to dominant
constitutional understandings. In that sense, the Constitution is superior to
both the presidency and the judiciary. Second, in the ideal world, we
should want presidential actors to care deeply about their constitutional
responsibilities, to become expert at carrying them out, and to strive to
persuade others of the correctness of their interpretation when they believe
others have fallen short. Third, executive-based development of rights
assumes even greater importance when one understands that courts can
handle only so many cases as a practical matter and have restricted court
access through a host of technical legal doctrines. That means that for
many kinds of executive actions, policies, and practices, regular judicial
oversight is simply not realistic.
It is possible, of course, for a populist president to conceive of rights in
ways that depart from established judicial understandings. For example,
during his campaign, President Trump endorsed policies that diverged
170

Elections that lead to a change in party control of the executive branch qualify as such a
jurisprudentially disruptive event, though the degree of disjunction will vary depending on the right in
question. Trump’s political rhetoric suggests that he does not consider reversal of established gay rights
as a priority, but his pick of Jeff Sessions as Attorney General suggests augur changes in areas that are
not yet well established. For instance, a shift in position on the rights of transgendered persons was
always more likely than not given his choice of Vice-President and Attorney General, both of whom
are social conservatives opposed to expanding rights for sexual minorities, and the other shoe indeed
dropped within two months of Trump taking office. See Jeremy W. Peters et al., Trump Rescinds Rules
on Bathrooms for Transgender Students, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/02/22/uss/politics/devos-sessions-transgender-students-rights.html.
171
Running against the Court and its same-sex marriage ruling is one thing (one would expect
most Republican presidential candidates to do this), but what resources an elected president would
actually devote to undermining the individual right is quite another.
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from judicial rulings on free speech, religious freedom, search and seizure,
and cruel and usual punishment. My model recognizes a president’s
prerogative to make claims that judicial conceptions fail to strike the right
balance given the people’s sentiments or priorities. Every president has the
power to test the social foundations of constitutional law. But he will have
to be ready to battle to actually alter settled expectations about rights.
Where a conception of rights is not well codified, either in judicial
rulings or statutes, a change in position on the part of a president does not
threaten the judicial function. It might result in unwise policy, but that
alone would not upset the constitutional balance. Granting more
protections to individuals within a president’s sphere of authority than the
courts have done (say, as the military’s new policies regarding sexuality
do) generally raises no problem, unless there is a direct conflict with
another constitutional power or individual liberty.
But what if a president decides that individual rights have gone too far,
and insists that judicial interpretations should be restricted further or
explicitly overruled? This might characterize President Trump’s Muslim
travel ban, which has tested well-established ideas of equality and religious
freedom, as much as it describes FDR’s more limited theory of the right of
contract in the 1930s.172 Here, too, a president’s chances of success will
turn on whether he resists judicial interpretations in ways that still respect
the courts’ prerogative to say what the law is. Outright defiance of a
binding judicial order will rarely be countenanced. Yet, short of waging
open war against the judiciary, a president can often reshape rights in his
own domain, and then cajole others—agencies, legislators, and even
judges—to go along.
C. Presidential Leadership Rather than Partisan Entrenchment or the
“Ground Up” Approach
Political parties play an important role in the development of rights and
the prospect that a president might seize a leadership role over such
matters. Parties shape agendas by determining policies that can impact
established rights, and by describing certain kinds of issues in rights-based
rhetoric. They generate support for some rights over others, and try to force
172
Upon taking office, President Trump signed an Executive Order restricting travel and refugees
from seven majority-Muslim nations, while declaring publicly that Christian refugee claims would be
given priority over others (the Executive Order itself speaks of minority religions in each country).
Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017). That order was immediately enjoined by the
courts. Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 WL 462040 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017). Trump
then signed a second executive order, which reduced the number of countries affected to six and
deleted the minority-religion preference. Exec. Order No. 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 6,
2017). That order, too, has been tied up by judges. Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 755 (9th Cir.), cert.
granted sub nom. Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 198 L. Ed. 2d 643
(2017), and cert. granted, judgment vacated, No. 16-1540, 2017 WL 4782860 (U.S. Oct. 24, 2017).
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candidates who wish to bear a party’s standard to pre-commit to these
rights. Once elected, party leaders can try to keep the momentum going on
certain rights through lobbying the president, and if a president commits
openly to a rights-based course of action (e.g., healthcare, ending the ban
on gays in the military), the party may lend a hand by reinforcing an
administration’s messages.
At the same time, partisan processes describe some, but not all, of the
dynamics at work when the executive branch seeks to lead the
development of rights. Some comparative points can be drawn in reference
to Jack Balkin and Sandy Levinson’s work, which outlines a model of
constitutional lawmaking that they call “partisan entrenchment.”173
According to this model, constitutional doctrines change in large part as
presidents try to inscribe their party’s policy preferences on the law. For
Balkin and Levinson, the key to the model is that partisans anticipating an
eventual loss of access to formal power take steps to entrench their
constitutional visions by appointing judges who seem to share their
values.174 Although these authors at times seem to limit the scope of their
theory to the appointments power and exclude presidential constructions of
the Constitution, at other times they suggest that a full version of the theory
would include advisory actions and litigation conducted by executive
branch lawyers.175
What Balkin and Levinson get right is that judicial endorsement of
another actor’s constitutional theory is the gold standard as a matter of
party strategy; judicial interpretations carry a normative claim, backed by
the practice of judicial review, across multiple social domains. But the
theory of partisan entrenchment is incomplete in several ways.
First, it blurs partisan processes with other institutional dynamics that
are not overtly partisan in nature. These non-partisan processes that can
influence executive-based development of rights include agencies, the civil
service, the foreign policy establishment, advocacy groups, and the legal
profession. As the Trump administration’s troubles in advancing its agenda
have revealed, these actors, organizations, and their non-governmental
allies have independent characters of their own; they can find themselves
acting in concert with a party in power on a question of rights, but can also
find themselves at odds with a presidential agenda to preserve a
predecessor’s theories of rights and powers. To subsume all of these
173

Balkin & Levinson, supra note 20, at 491; see also Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson,
Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1068 (2001) (“Partisan
entrenchment through presidential appointments to the judiciary is the best account of how the meaning
of the Constitution changes over time through Article III interpretation rather than through Article V
amendment.”).
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Balkin & Levinson, supra note 20, at 490–92.
175
See id. at 497–500 (discussing prominent theories of constitutional change).
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dynamics within a president’s desire to advance his party’s interests is to
deny these individuals and associations agency.
Second, the fact that the appointments power remains central to the
story of partisan entrenchment keeps courts at the center of constitutional
theory. By doing so, it misses that a president can often make
constitutional law in his own domain without resorting to the courts, even
if doing so goes beyond, or at times appears to undermine, judicial
interpretations of rights. A president’s vision of constitutional liberty and
equality can be spread among executive branch institutions, administrative
regulations, advisory opinions, and agency policies, quite apart from what
courts say (which I should add, tends to be cautious and undertheorized
most of the time, anyway).
Third, partisan considerations are crucial, but not always
determinative, features of presidential decision making. Not all individual
rights are prominently featured in a party’s platform and when they are, a
president is free to set his own priorities and timetable for progress on such
matters. Moreover, partisan dynamics cannot fully account for the
dynamics of transformative leadership. A president inhabits a different
mindset from that of a party leader when he seeks to articulate a theory of
individual rights, one in which he believes he must represent all of the
people of the United States.
My criticism of partisan entrenchment does not mean that political
parties are irrelevant. It means only that actions have to be justified on
more than partisan terms and that it is important for a president to avoid
charges of overly partisan behaviors when seeking to transform
constitutional rights. Any president worth his salt is driven by a desire to
create a historical legacy, and this psycho-political dimension of legal
development is broader and more complicated than satisfying one political
party’s demands. A president’s reputation—if he is to be remembered as a
great leader—entails successfully confronting national problems that arise,
rather than simply pushing a list of policy objectives drawn up by political
patrons. In this sense, partisan entrenchment misstates the frame of mind
necessary to alter constitutional commitments in a durable fashion.
If the two-party system alone cannot drive or authorize constitutional
change, neither can a particular social movement do all the work that is
necessary for lasting shifts. “Bottom-up” accounts of law have helped
recover lost details about the lives of less celebrated social activists and the
forgotten connections between legal ideas.176 But social movement theory
176
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ultimately runs out of explanatory power when it comes to constitutional
change. For one thing, because a movement lacks formal authority under
the Constitution and laws, no social movement can ever exercise the power
to initiate or authorize constitutional change. For another thing, concerns
will always be raised that a movement does not represent widespread
sentiment. Instead, every movement is vulnerable to charges that it
represents parochial or partial interests.
Many movements associate themselves with particular parties to gain
proximity to power (say, the Labor movement and the gay rights
movement with the Democrats, or the Tea Party movement and the pro-life
movement with the Republicans). But any movement that links its agenda
to party politics risks capture by party operatives and the dilution of
movement goals.
At its finest, a social movement can invoke the rhetoric and tradition of
popular sovereignty to prick the conscience of fellow Americans and try to
shape the terms of debate. Its members can turn to the courts, seek to
infiltrate governmental agencies, and agitate outside of formal processes
when the odds look long. But most of the time, they must hope for a
rupture in historical time or the emergence of a national coalition.
In fact, the best plan for constitutional success is to secure the support
of formal decision makers. Courts have been a favorite institution for
activists, but for reasons already discussed, judges remain unreliable allies.
Constitutional change through judicial appointments takes years,
sometimes decades, to reach the point that a major doctrinal shift is
pronounced and likely to take place. Legislators, too, are a fractured bunch
and the costs of securing enough legislative support can be too high a price
for marginalized groups to pay.
Faced with these choices, presidential leadership over rights can
present the most dynamic and promising option. Presidents and their allies,
more than any other national actor, can efficaciously respond to a
movement’s grievances and lend legitimacy to its cause. It is easier to
infiltrate government agencies and bypass formal processes to gain the ear
of a well-connected White House aide. Executive branch officials have a
wide range of tools by which to advance the cause of rights outside of the
courts—not only in making tangible legal changes but also in trying to
shape public discourse.
A president’s lawyers enjoy clout precisely because they are not
perceived as movement figures. Even so, in the courts, high officials can
adopt movement language and ideas, urging judges to see the stakes as
they do and to speak about them in similar terms. More than ever, it makes
sense to pay close attention to this model of legal transformation,
especially in a world where the Supreme Court takes fewer and fewer cases
and Congress remains gridlocked for much of the time.
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Presidential intervention occurred at a key moment for the marriage
equality movement. After major setbacks, activists began to secure
achievements at the state level. These successes came in beating back antigay marriage laws at the ballot box and advancing the cause of marriage
equality in the courts—especially in Massachusetts. Wins in state court
helped build momentum for victories in federal court, and those federal
judicial decisions could then be taken to other state courts.177
But even then, the federal DOMA loomed. That federal law, signed by
a Democratic President and supported by many legislators at the time,
remained a major obstacle to recognition of gay marriage as a social good
that implicated the rights of national citizenship. DOMA not only barred
federal agencies from treating gay marriages the same as opposite-sex
marriages, but it also signaled to important constituencies and state actors
that the people as a whole embraced traditional marriage.
President Obama’s change of mind on the issue came at a crucial time:
late enough that he could not be considered a crusader, but early enough to
have an impact on the ultimate outcome. His aides’ creation of a different
constitutional theory of rights, and their efforts to implement a new
conception of equality across multiple agencies, helped alter the social
environment in which landmark judicial decisions were made. In both
word and deed, the administration characterized gay marriage as a social
good governed by constitutional law, as consistent with popular sentiment
and the lived experience of ordinary Americans, and as a right that the
executive branch would help to enforce. And in the end, those efforts
helped put that individual right on a path to wider acceptance.
CONCLUSION
This article has employed the Obama administration’s turnabout on
gay marriage as a case study on how a president can create constitutional
rights in his own spheres of influence, popularize alternative theories of the
Constitution, and prod the courts to reconsider their interpretation of rights.
This model of constitutional law making is premised on the phenomenon
of presidential leadership, which allows such a figure to seek
transformative changes in the nation’s laws and policies by appealing to
popular sentiment.
An American president who invokes this tradition to remake
constitutional rights faces many social constraints. Most of the time, he
will have to exploit legal opportunities created by others. When the model
177
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succeeds—and the recognition of same-sex marriage as a constitutional
right can be counted as a success story for this model of leadership—social
conflict must turn into institutional coordination long enough for new
values to be codified. On this occasion, the right to same-sex marriage
became mutually reinforced through judicial rulings, executive branch
policies, and interpretations of federal law.

